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1Introduction
The unemployment rate is an important and well-
publicised measure of labour market performance in
developed market economies. It is currently high in the
EU compared with other developed countries and still
well above its historical average nearly a decade after
the beginning of the global financial crisis. But focusing
exclusively on the unemployment rate fails to take
account of other numerically important manifestations
of labour market slack (or simply labour slack), defined
in this report as the shortfall between the volume of
work desired by workers and the actual volume of work
available. These other indicators have grown
significantly since the crisis and have been slower to
respond to the recovery than the unemployment rate
itself.
This report provides a broader measure of labour slack
in the EU, based on EU Labour Force Survey data that
cover involuntary part-timers and inactive people with
some labour market attachment as well as the
unemployed.
Policy context
The Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth includes the commitment to raise the
average EU employment rate to 75% (for those aged 20–
64 years) by 2020. Progress to this target was dented by
the lingering recession that followed the global financial
crisis. Aggregate EU employment rates and levels have
had a sustained recovery since 2013, however, while
employment has been boosted by a structural increase
in the labour market participation of older people and
women, traditionally underrepresented categories. In
the medium term, demographic shifts mean that there
is likely to be a growing need to reintegrate those who
are inactive but willing to work into the labour market
and to make it easier for the underemployed to work
the number of hours they wish and, in many cases, need
to work.
The European Commission’s revised package of
employment guidelines from 2015 targets
improvements in labour supply and underlines the
importance of tackling both high unemployment and
inactivity. Growing inactivity among core-age men has
been evident in some developed market economies,
including in many EU Member States, over the last
generation and has been exacerbated by the sector-
specific effects of the crisis. One approach to addressing
resurgent populism, which holds a growing appeal for
this demographic group, is to tackle the decline in the
labour market fortunes of core-age men, particularly
those with educational attainment below tertiary level.
Key findings
£ Four-fifths of the jobless population of working age
(15–64 years-old) in the EU are inactive as opposed
to unemployed. Many have some form of labour
market attachment, and many indicate that they
would like to work, are seeking work or are
available to work. In addition, part-time work has
been growing in most Member States and so, too,
has the share of part-time workers who would like
to work longer hours.
£ There were close to 23 million unemployed people
of working age in the EU in 2015 but around 50
million people in a broader category of labour slack,
encompassing inactive people wishing to work and
underemployed, involuntary part-timers as well as
the unemployed. Labour slack has been slower to
unwind than unemployment following the upturn
in labour market performance since 2013.
£ The estimated labour slack rate in the EU rose more
between 2008 and 2015 (from 11.8% to 14.9%) than
the unemployment rate (from 7.1% to 9.5%).
£ Beyond the unemployed population, the largest
category of labour slack was involuntary part-
timers (nearly 10 million in 2015, approximately one
in four part-timers), followed by those who were
available and wanting to work but who were not
seeking work and therefore considered inactive
rather than unemployed (nearly 9 million in 2015).
£ Involuntary part-timers were more likely to have
started their current job within the last year and to
work in basic or lower-level service occupations
and sectors (for example, household work). They
were also more likely to be women, although this is
mainly a result of the greater female share of part-
time workers overall. Looking just at the part-time
population and controlling for other factors, men
were more likely than women to be working part
time involuntarily.
£ Among inactive people available for but not seeking
work, the main reason given for not seeking work is
‘discouragement’, the belief that no work is
available. This has increased, markedly so for men,
since 2008, most likely as a result of the severe
impacts of the recession on predominantly male-
employing sectors such as manufacturing and
construction. The strongest determinants of
belonging to this category were age – the older, the
more likely – and the time elapsed since one’s last
job.
Executive summary
2£ Despite rapidly increasing rates of older worker
participation, there remains a sizeable potential
workforce among older people willing to work but
discouraged from doing so. The fact that there is
such a steep age gradient for discouragement could
imply barriers (perceived or actual) of age
discrimination or of obsolete skills.
£ While employment and participation rates have
grown for women and older people in recent years,
they have declined for core-age men (25–54 years-
old), traditionally the category with the strongest
labour market attachment. This decline has been
most marked in the USA, but a milder version of the
same phenomenon can be observed in EU Member
States as well. At least two circumstances
conducive to inactivity among core-age men appear
to have gained importance in recent years: self-
reported discouragement (probably related to
depressed labour demand in traditionally male-
employing sectors) and self-reported disability.
£ The variation in increased labour market
performance across EU Member States after 2008 is
also evident in broader labour slack trends. Two
Member States in particular stand out in the
analysis: Italy and Germany. The labour slack rate in
Italy was almost double that of the unemployment
rate; a quarter of the working-age population were
either unemployed or in one of the other labour
slack categories. In 2015, over a half of the EU’s
discouraged workers were located in Italy. On the
other hand, the improved labour market
performance in Germany is even more evident
when measured in terms of labour slack than
unemployment. There were, for example, almost a
million fewer involuntary part-timers in Germany in
2015 than in 2008.
Conclusions
The focus on addressing unemployment ought not to
distract from the potentially equally important task of
strengthening the labour market attachment of various
categories of inactive or underemployed citizens.
Concentrating solely on the unemployment rate gives
only a partial picture of the real labour demand. There
are, for example, more inactive ‘job-wanters’ than
active job-seekers (unemployed). While they can
represent particular challenges to active labour market
policy, many of these can and will be mobilised to
return to the labour market if the recovery that began in
2013 can be sustained. 
It is also the case that structural shifts in labour demand
– towards services – mean that an increasing share of
those in work are working part time or irregular hours
and would prefer to work longer hours. A growing share
of precarious work has implications for earnings,
employment outcomes and ultimately well-being at the
individual level but is also likely to undermine growth
and output at the aggregate level. 
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3This report analyses the phenomenon of joblessness
and underemployment in the EU and identifies recent
trends using European Union Labour Force Survey
(EU-LFS) data. The aim is to develop a more nuanced
estimate of labour market slack and, in particular, the
extent to which the aggregate demand for work by
individuals is not being met by employer demand for
paid labour.
One of the motivations for the analysis is the simple
observation that a large majority of jobless people of
working age (15–64 years-old) are not unemployed but
are inactive. Unemployed people, according to the
definition of the International Labour Organization
(ILO), are without work but seeking work and available
for work; anyone who is neither employed nor
unemployed is categorised as inactive. As Figure 1
shows, around 35% of the working-age population were
in the combined group of unemployed and inactive –
the non-employed – in the European Union in 2015. 
Within the non-employed, about one in five were
unemployed. The unemployment rate remains high in
the EU (8.2% in the third quarter of 2016) compared
with other developed countries and still well above its
historical average eight years after the beginning of the
global financial crisis. It also remains exceptionally high
in certain Member States – for instance, above 22% in
Greece and 18% in Spain. But an exclusive focus on the
unemployment rate as an indicator of labour market
performance fails to take account of the four-fifths of
the jobless population who are inactive rather than
unemployed. Many of these individuals, as will be seen,
have some form of labour market attachment – they
would like to work, are seeking work or are available to
work.
A second motivation for the report is the increasingly
fragmented nature of the modern labour market, not
just, for example, in terms of the increasing diversity of
working time schedules of the employed, but also in the
degrees of attachment to the labour market of those not
currently employed. The EU-LFS includes many
questions that offer a way to describe and characterise
different groups, some of which are relatively under-
used.
A third motivation is that improving labour market
performance in recent years has not to date resulted in
the anticipated wage or price pressures. Inflation in the
euro zone, for example, has consistently undershot the
2% target rate set by the European Central Bank, not
just in the dual crisis period (2008–2013) as would be
expected, but also largely in the period of relatively
robust employment expansion since 2013. This is
reflected also in subdued upward pressure on wages.
With demand increasing but prices (and wages)
remaining largely stable, this suggests that there may
be an additional reserve of potential labour supply
restraining wage levels from rising, and that
conventional measures (the unemployment rate or
employment growth) may be increasingly unreliable
proxies for estimating labour market slack.
Introduction
Figure 1: Total working-age population (in millions) by employment status, EU, 2015       
Note: Workers aged 15–64 years-old.





4One way of addressing the inadequacies of the
unemployment rate as a labour market performance
indicator is to focus instead on the employment rate
(or the non-employment rate, its simple obverse). The
employment rate covers all people, including the
inactive population, in its denominator. This gives it the
advantage of being more comprehensive than the
unemployment rate, which disregards the inactive
population altogether. It represents the total of people
in employment as a percentage of the overall
population of a given age. This has been the approach in
EU employment policy going back to the European
Employment Strategy in the mid-1990s. The numerical
employment targets in the Lisbon Agenda (a 70%
overall employment rate for the working age
population, 60% for women and 50% for older people)
and the Europe 2020 strategy (a 75% employment rate
for those aged 20–64 years-old) have been framed in
terms of the employment rate, not the unemployment
rate.
Nevertheless, the employment rate fails to capture
some dimensions of labour market slack. As a pure
headcount measure, it fails to distinguish between the
labour input of someone working 1 hour per week and
someone working 40 hours. The EU-LFS offers different
possibilities to characterise individuals working very
short hours, including those for whom such short hours
are involuntary. Later this report estimates an average
worker headcount equivalent of the paid labour desired
but not worked by such workers. As a necessary
complement, it draws attention to broader secular
trends in labour market participation such as the
increased labour market participation of older people
and women, the declining participation of younger
people (linked particularly to extended periods of
education) and declining core-age (25–54 years-old)
male employment rates. The combination of these
factors has led to increasing aggregate participation
rates, as growth in participation in the structurally
increasing categories has tended to outweigh declines
in the structurally decreasing categories. But, for
instance, for core-age male workers – the traditional
mainstay of the labour force in male-breadwinner-
based systems – it is fair to assume that declining
participation and employment rates represent an
important and growing category of labour market slack,
one only partially captured by unemployment data.
The remainder of this report is set out as follows. 
Chapter 1 describes in more detail what is meant by
‘labour market slack’. 
Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of existing measures
of underemployment and broad unemployment. This
overview is selective and far from exhaustive but is
indicative of the extensive efforts of economists,
statisticians and labour market analysts to delve
beyond the simple (and very useful) three-category ILO
labour force model – comprising the employed, the
unemployed and the inactive – that underpins most
labour market data. It seeks to look at these categories
as part of a continuum with many grey zones between
individual statuses. It is these grey zones that are of
most interest to this report. 
Chapter 3 presents an extended descriptive analysis of
the ‘potential additional labour force’ categories
developed by Eurostat in its supplementary indicators
of unemployment. The EU-LFS, for example, contains a
number of questions that make it possible to probe
more deeply the extent to which the inactive may have
some attachment to the labour force; these include
questions on respondents’ self-reported employment
status and their willingness to work.
Chapter 4 takes a different approach and tries to
identify employment categories where the existence of
labour market slack may be inferred from changing
trends of labour market participation. It looks in
particular at employment and participation rates by age
and sex, as well as changes in the reasons cited for
inactivity – notably, increases in levels of self-reported
incapacity or disability. Where declines have occurred
for specific groups, such as core-age male workers, an
assessment is made of the contribution of this secular
trend to labour market slack. 
A final chapter offers some summary conclusions.
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5Labour market slack can be defined in different ways.
For the purposes of this report, labour market slack (or
simply labour slack) is considered to be the shortfall
between the volume of work desired by workers and the
actual volume of available work. It describes the unmet
demand for paid labour in a population.
Labour slack exists when there are more workers willing
to work a given number of hours than available jobs
providing those hours of work. In such cases, some
people’s demand for employment remains frustrated,
and they stay involuntarily jobless; alternatively, they
work fewer hours than they would like. A tight labour
market is one in which demand for labour is at least as
strong as supply – in other words, one in which
employers compete for workers. As such, it is generally
one in which employee bargaining power on wages and
employment conditions is stronger. A slack labour
market is one in which the existence of substitute
labour (a labour reserve) gives employers an upper
hand in the employer–employee relationship,
potentially bidding down wages. Tight labour markets
tend to benefit the employment and working conditions
of workers; slack labour markets tend to favour
employer interests.
There are other manifestations of underemployment or
of labour slack, for example that arising from skill
mismatches between highly qualified workers in low-
skill jobs. However, these are covered in an established
and fast-growing literature and are outside the scope of
the current report. Similarly, this report does not
address the issue of inadequate pay, another important
element of the ‘labour underutilisation framework’,1
which underpins much of the methodological and
conceptual work on underemployment carried out by
the ILO since the 1960s. This report is concerned purely
with the component of the framework labelled labour
slack in Figure 2 or ‘the insufficiency of the volume of
work’ (ILO, 2008).
From a monetary policy perspective, an estimation of
labour slack is an important parameter for calibrating
the output gap and, therefore, for informing interest-
rate-setting and other monetary policy interventions. It
1 What is labour market slack? 
1 Devised in the 1970s as a way of operationalising the measurement of labour underutilisation and underemployment and adopted by the ILO’s
International Conference of Labour Statisticians. For a summary of its historical development, see ILO, 2008, pp. 12–14. 
Figure 2: Labour underutilisation schema










£ Other inactive persons with labour force attachment
£ Full-time employed with low monthly earnings
£ Less than full-time employed with low hourly earnings
£ Overly employed with low earnings
£ Employed in jobs with skill requirement below educational level
6is often in this macroeconomic perspective that
estimations of labour slack are framed. The approach
often relies on comparing the real unemployment rate
against a reference rate such as the structural
unemployment rate – for instance, the non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or the
non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU).
A real unemployment rate higher than the reference
rate indicates labour slack and the potential to expand
employment without triggering price (or wage)
increases. A real unemployment rate lower than the
reference rate indicates a tight labour market, where
further decreases in unemployment are apt to increase
upward pressure on prices and wages. In essence, the
basis of these calculations is that unemployment is
subordinate as a public policy concern to price stability
and that measuring labour slack is useful primarily as a
proxy measure of overall economic conditions.
While these data are important, in particular for
economic and monetary policy-setting, the main
consideration in this report is that unemployment and
joblessness represent a waste of resources at economic
and societal level that is also damaging to many of the
individuals affected. Joblessness correlates with social
stress along various dimensions as documented in an
extensive literature – increased risk of poverty and
homelessness, divorce, suicide, mortality and mental ill-
health (see Bell and Blanchflower, 2009, for a summary).
In work-centred societies, being jobless is often
stigmatising and is one of the main sources of reduced
social, material and psychological well-being. There is
also an emerging literature that points to similar
negative consequences of underemployment (Dooley
and Prause, 2004). The approach taken in this report,
therefore, is to look in more detail at different
categories of joblessness and underemployment based
on microdata from the EU-LFS: how they are evolving,
how they are composed and what factors may be
contributing to trend changes.2 The policy interest is
more to inform labour market, employment and
activation policies than macroeconomic policy more
broadly.
Unemployment
The most important proxy of labour slack is the
unemployment rate. To be considered unemployed,
one must be without work, seeking work and available
for work. This means that there is an active individual
demand for work that is not being met.
In an ideally functioning labour market, all adults
wishing to work would be employed and would be
working their desired number of hours. But existing
labour markets are not ideal, and are not ideal along a
number of dimensions. To begin with, there are
structural impediments to the full matching of labour
supply and demand, which result in different types of
unemployment.
First, there is unemployment that is ‘frictional’ in the
sense that it relates to the period of job search of
someone newly entering the labour market or someone
who has just lost or quit their job and is seeking a
suitable new job. One in five unemployed people had
been unemployed for three months or fewer in 2015, so
they were in the early stages of searching for a job. Job
counselling and other forms of active engagement by
public or private employment services are approaches
to facilitating good-quality job-matching.
Second, there is ‘real wage unemployment’ where a job-
seeker’s wage demands exceed employers’ wage offers
for a given job. This is based on the classical economics
paradigm of a competitive, market-clearing labour
market. It may arise, for example, when market wage
rates decline for a given occupation, and workers are
unwilling to supply their labour at the new, lower rate.
Tax incentives such as working tax credits are an
example of a policy that aims to overcome the
misalignment of wages demanded and those on offer.
A third form of structural unemployment is ‘mismatch
unemployment’ where, for reasons of trade or
technological change, individuals may possess skills for
which there is no or limited labour market demand.
A typical example would be a skilled craft worker in
manufacturing in a region beset by deindustrialisation.
The traditional panacea is retraining to adapt skill
profiles to match the skill demands of growing sectors
or occupations. Wage-insurance-type measures can also
help to address such mismatches by incentivising those
who lose their jobs to take up available alternative work
by partially or fully compensating for any earnings loss,
generally either for a given period or with declining
levels of compensatory payment.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
2 The advantages of the EU-LFS for this type of analysis, compared with the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), are that
it adheres more strictly to the ‘official’ ILO labour force status categories and that its much larger sample allows for a more detailed breakdown by
demographic or by other subcategory. With its more explicit longitudinal dimension, the EU-SILC offers greater possibilities for characterising individuals
not just by their current labour force status but also by the change of that status over time. This has recently been exploited in the joint projects of the
European Commission, the OECD and the World Bank – Faces of Joblessness and Portraits of Labour Market Exclusion – investigating employment
barriers preventing individuals from engaging fully in the labour market (Sundaram et al, 2014; Fernandez et al, 2016). 
7A fourth form of unemployment, and quantitatively the
most important, relates to the broader macroeconomic
context. Cyclical unemployment relates to alternations
of labour demand over the business cycle. In a steep
recession, such as the one suffered following the global
financial crisis, demand for labour drops. As the
economy has recovered in the EU, notably since 2013,
increased labour demand is evident in improving
employment and participation rates and in declining
unemployment rates. Nonetheless, at aggregate level,
much higher EU unemployment rates (8.2% in 2016 Q3)
than in Japan (3%) or the USA (5%) are a simple
indication that, of all developed market economies,
labour slack is greatest in the EU. This is so particularly
in those seven Member States with unemployment rates
above 11% in 2015 (Table 10).
All of the above varieties of unemployment are to some
extent inevitable in the dynamic churn of competitive
labour markets. For this reason, there has been an
increasing acceptance that mathematical ‘full
employment’ (0% unemployment) is unachievable and
that that there is a ‘natural rate’ (Friedman, 1968) of
unemployment in developed economies. This is
sometimes formalised as NAIRU or NAWRU. These
formulations imply that assessing the equilibrium
between labour market supply and demand should take
into account the impact of employment and
unemployment on other important economic variables
such as wages and prices. Unemployment rates that fall
below NAIRU – 5% is a common ‘guesstimate’ of NAIRU
in developed market economies – may have negative
consequences, prompting increased inflation with
destabilising second-order effects including in the
labour market. Without some labour slack, there may be
wage price spirals or other pathologies of labour market
functioning. In other words, some unemployment may
be not only inevitable but actually beneficial – ‘no
economy can function well without some
unemployment’, according to the authors of a seminal




For a variety of reasons related to the specific
definitions of different labour force statuses, the
employment rate is at best an imperfect proxy of the
phenomenon of labour slack, that is, the mismatch
between hours of work wanted and those actually
worked.
In the first instance, the ILO definition of employment is
broad and permissive and includes all of those who
worked for at least one hour for pay or profit in a
reference week. But, according to EU-LFS data, most of
those working less than eight hours do not consider
their main status as being employed; their own
assessment of their labour market status therefore
differs from that of official statistics. Also, many people
working a small number of hours a week may wish to
work more. They are employed but underemployed and
represent one important category of labour slack, the
so-called involuntary part-timers.
Inactivity
While the official ILO definition of employment is quite
broad and permissive, that of unemployment is quite
strict and relies on a number of conditions being met
simultaneously. An unemployed person must not have
been employed during a reference week, must be
available to work within the next two weeks and must
have actively sought work in the last four weeks.3
Those who meet only some of those conditions are not
considered unemployed but inactive. This happens, for
instance, with people who are not working, are
available for work but are not seeking work, or with
those seeking work but who are not available (for
instance, due to household or education commitments)
in the next two weeks.
In the USA, versions of these categories are considered
‘marginally attached’ to the labour force. They occupy a
grey zone somewhere between outright inactivity and
the active labour market. The category of people who
are not working, available for work but not seeking work
includes, with some definitional modifications, a
subgroup of ‘discouraged workers’, people who want to
work but have given up looking because they do not
believe that suitable work is available. The scale of this
group tends to reflect that of the unemployed, growing
What is labour market slack? 
3 The definition of unemployment used in the EU-LFS refers to the age group 15–74. This is broader than the working-age population, generally understood
as those between 15 and 64 years-old. For the purposes of calculating unemployment rates, the addition of those aged 65–74 rarely makes much
difference in developed economy labour markets. The unemployment rate is the share of those unemployed in the total labour force (the sum of
employed and unemployed people). Most people over 65 are inactive (voluntarily retired); only a very small proportion is jobless and seeking
employment. 
8in a recession as job opportunities diminish and
declining in a recovery as fresh job possibilities draw the
inactive back into the labour market. Their willingness
to work makes discouraged workers similar to the
unemployed. In the USA, their transition rates to
employment are also more like those of the
unemployed than of the inactive. Nonetheless, they are
categorised as inactive as they have not sought work in
the previous four weeks.
This is an important category numerically, amounting to
some 10 million people in the EU in 2015 (equivalent to
5% of those in employment and nearly 50% of the
unemployed). The existence of a high non-employment
rate or of a low employment rate (employment to
population ratio) is often an indication of a high share of
discouraged workers. As will be seen later, Italy is
currently an example of a country with a high share of
inactive people with some labour market attachment.
The important thing is that they are not counted in the
official unemployment statistics and can be considered
a category of ‘hidden unemployment’.4
In most cases, inactivity is ostensibly voluntary – for
example, in cases of retirement, domestic caring
activities or participation in full-time education. A large
majority of individuals of working age in the EU who are
classified as inactive do not want to work (82%), but the
remaining 18% – including the categories described
above – indicate a willingness to work. They represent
nearly 16 million potential workers in the EU, nearly all
of whom indicate a wish to work and include many who
could be activated into employment.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
4 Or in some cases as the ‘hidden employed’, for example if they are engaged in undeclared work in the informal economy but self-reporting as inactive in
the EU-LFS, possibly out of a preference for not revealing their irregular work status. According to Contini and Grand (2014), a high share of those
classified as inactive in the Italian labour market may be active in the informal economy. 
9There are different proxy measures of labour slack
based on macroeconomic data:
£ decreased numbers of advertised vacancies or a
decreasing ratio of vacancies to unemployed
people (measured, among other methods, by the
Beveridge curve);
£ less difficulty for employers in filling vacant posts;
£ suppressed real wage levels; 5
£ unemployment higher than some threshold level
consistent with ‘full employment’;
£ other forms of ‘visible’ underemployment that are
measurable using labour force surveys, including
sharp drops in average weekly working hours or
increases in the share of those working part time
involuntarily.
As already indicated, the particular interest in this
report is to enrich or supplement the final two measures
in this list by identifying those non-employed with
potentially stronger labour market attachment. These
can be considered as a ‘halo’ around unemployment in
a broader operationalisation of labour slack (ILO, 2008). 
The EU-LFS includes many variables that allow a more
detailed characterisation of joblessness to be
developed. Three categories – involuntary part-time
workers, inactive people seeking work but not available,
and inactive people available for but not seeking work –
have been identified by Eurostat as belonging to the
potential additional labour force in its supplementary
indicators of unemployment (De la Fuente, 2011). Data
on the potential additional labour force have been
reported regularly by Eurostat since 2011 based on the
EU-LFS. As the next section highlights, it is just one of a
variety of measures that have been operationalised to
address the inadequacies of the unemployment rate as
a proxy of labour slack.
Alternative approaches to
measuring labour slack
The potential additional labour force indicators have
been influenced by the broader M4–M6 unemployment
rate measures developed in the USA by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which cover similar categories of the
employed (involuntary part-time) and the inactive
(discouraged or marginally attached workers). They are
more directly also an offshoot of methodological work
carried out at the ILO in its working group on labour
underutilisation (see, for example, ILO, 2008). Other
measures have also been devised by labour economists,
think tanks and labour statisticians. A small selection of
interesting operationalisations, mainly developed with
application to the US labour market, are described
below.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics measures 
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics proposes six
alternative measures of labour market underutilisation
(US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). Three of them
refer to:
£ people unemployed for 15 weeks or longer as a
percentage of the civilian labour force (U-1); 
£ job losers and people who completed temporary
jobs as a percentage of the civilian labour force
(U-2); 
£ total unemployed as a percentage of the civilian
labour force (U-3, the official unemployment rate). 
The other three measures are broader, as they take into
account additional groups apart from the unemployed,
as follows. 
£ Marginally attached: Individuals who are not in the
labour force, want work and are available for work,
and had looked for a job at some time in the
previous 12 months but not in the last four weeks,
for any reason.
£ Discouraged workers: A subgroup of the marginally
attached, whose defining characteristic is that they
have not looked for a job in the last four weeks
because they were discouraged about their job
prospects.
2 How is labour market slack
measured?  
5 An important driver of recent research on labour slack in the USA and the EU has been slower real wage growth than at similar stages of earlier recoveries
or similar levels of unemployment (see, for example, European Commission, 2016a, p. 23).
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£ People employed part time for economic reasons
(or ‘involuntary part-time workers’): Individuals
who want and are available to work full time, but
who are working fewer than 35 hours per week
because of economic reasons (such as a reduction
of their hours or inability to find a full-time job).
These three broader measures are described,
respectively, as follows by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2016):
£ U-4: Total unemployed plus discouraged workers as
a percentage of the civilian labour force plus
discouraged workers. When compared with the
standard unemployment rate, U-4 reflects the level
of discouragement of ‘would be job-seekers’.
£ U-5: Total unemployed plus discouraged workers
plus all other marginally attached workers as a
percentage of the civilian labour force plus all
marginally attached workers.
£ U-6: Total unemployed plus all marginally attached
workers plus total employed part time for economic
reasons as a percentage of the civilian labour force
plus all marginally attached workers. The larger the
difference between U-6 and U-5, the higher is the
incidence of involuntary part-time workers as a
form of underemployment.
Analysis of US data shows that the six measures of
labour underutilisation tend to move together over
time, even across business cycles.
Extended non-employment index
Again in the USA, Hornstein et al (2014) proposed an
extended non-employment index that aims to measure
labour resource utilisation more accurately than
through the standard unemployment rate. It does so by
assigning weights to different categories of the non-
employed based on their transition probabilities to
employment, effectively an ‘employability’ weight.
Based on data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
this index includes the unemployment rate and
additional metrics referring to categories such as those
‘out of the labour force’ – neither employed nor actively
looking for work – and involuntary part-time workers.
More specifically, these additional categories consist of
the following. 
£ Individuals who are out of the labour force and
want a job. They include the subgroup of the
marginally attached, which also covers the
discouraged workers (see the definitions above).
£ Individuals who are out of the labour force and do
not want a job. These are classified as retired,
disabled, currently in school, or other inactive
categories (‘neither retired, nor disabled, nor in
school’; Hornstein et al, 2014, p. 2).
£ Individuals who are working part time due to
economic reasons, but who would prefer to work
full time, and so can be considered an underutilised
labour resource (see the definition above).
The extended non-employment index is a weighted
average of these groups. It measures the total
availability of labour in terms of the short-term
unemployed, by using the following weights.
£ For each subgroup of the unemployed (short- and
long-term) and of the groups out of the labour force
(wanting a job or not), the weight corresponds to
the sample average of its job-finding rate relative to
the job-finding rate of the short-term unemployed.
£ For workers who are part time for economic
reasons, the weight is fixed at 50% (because these
workers are already employed, and it is not possible
to use their probability of entering employment as a
weight).
Findings from the analysis performed on US data (1994–
2013) show similar time trends in the extended
non-employment index and the standard
unemployment rate, suggesting that the latter does not
overstate the level of labour resource utilisation.
Underemployment index
Bell and Blanchflower (2013) stressed that the
unemployment rate does not fully capture the amount
of excess capacity in the labour market. For instance,
during economic recoveries, workers may want to work
additional hours, and employers may prefer to opt for
that possibility rather than creating new jobs. Such
changes would not be reflected in the unemployment
rate.
These authors developed an ‘underemployment index’,
combining measures of excess capacity in the labour
market, both of hours (intensive margin) and jobs
(extensive margin). The index aims to capture the
excess offer of demand in the labour market more
accurately than through the unemployment rate by
measuring the ratio of net unemployed hours to total
available hours. For a given unemployment rate, a
higher underemployment index indicates the
availability of extra labour capacity (willingness to work
additional hours) over and above those already in
employment.
The underemployment index is based on the calculation
of hours and is expressed in a rate form. Its construction
follows these steps.
£ The unemployment rate is converted into a
measurement based on the number of hours,
implicitly allocating equal hours to the employed
and the unemployed (h). The product of average
hours worked and employment equals the total
number of hours worked in the economy:
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£ The preferences over hours (addition of the
intensive margin of the labour market) are included
in the numerator as the net effect between the
positive (index k is defined over all workers who
want more hours) and negative (index j is defined
over all workers who want fewer hours) desired
changes in hours. If they are equal in size, the index
will reproduce the value of the unemployment rate,
and the excess capacity will be only influenced by
the extensive margin. On the other hand, uBB will
differ from the unemployment rate in cases of
excess demand or supply of labour in the internal
labour market:
In the same paper, Bell and Blanchflower (2013)
presented findings from their analysis of UK data (2001–
2013) comparing the unemployment rates with their
underemployment equivalents. They drew the following
conclusions. 
£ The unemployment rates underestimate the real
differences in excess labour capacity between age
groups. Differences between unemployment rates
by age groups increase when taking into account
the desired additional or fewer working hours
(younger workers want to work more hours, and the
opposite is the case for older workers).
£ The unemployment rates overestimate differences
between the sexes. If women are more likely than
men to find employment, they are also more likely
to be employed part time and to want to work
longer hours. Thus, despite lower female
unemployment rates, the underemployment index
shows similar levels of excess capacity within the
labour market for men and women.
‘Missing workers’ estimation
The Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a US think tank,
stresses that a large number of individuals not in
employment are not searching for a job because of
weak job opportunities in the US labour market, but
they would be either in employment or actively seeking
a job if the job opportunities were stronger (similar to
‘discouraged workers’). These people are defined as
‘missing workers’ (Economic Policy Institute, 2017). The
method for estimating the number of missing workers
relies on extrapolating participation rate trends in 16
age–sex classes from the 1980s to the present, with
greater weight given to more recent periods. This
contributes to establishing a reference level of the
expected structural level of employment in the
economy. The shortfall between that reference level
and the actual level of employment are ‘missing
workers’. By not taking into account jobless individuals
not looking for a job, the unemployment rate does not
cover the category of missing workers and thus
understates the weakness of job opportunities. Data
from October 2016 show that if missing workers were
looking for work, the unemployment rate in the USA
would amount to 6.1% rather than the official
unemployment rate of 4.9%.
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Each of the measures described above has been
developed to address perceived weaknesses of the
unemployment rate as a measure of labour market
performance, while nonetheless building on the
unemployment rate as their basic foundation. They
proceed by adding supplementary forms of
underemployment or of marginally attached
workers on top of this foundation. Their
identification of supplementary forms of labour
slack is likely be increasingly salient with the
increasing share of part-time work, including part-
time work involving very short hours, and the
emergence of other forms of very atypical or
marginal employment such as, for example, that




There were approximately 22.8 million unemployed
people in the EU in 2015 out of a total working age
population of 330 million. Using Eurostat’s
supplementary indicators of unemployment, it is
possible to identify a further 21 million people who are
either underemployed or in the potential additional
labour force (De La Fuente, 2011). 
As Figure 3 illustrates, around 10 million of these were in
employment, classified as involuntary part-timers.
These workers wished to work longer hours and were
carrying out part-time work only in the absence of a
position offering them their desired working hours.
The remaining 11 million were inactive people – neither
employed nor unemployed. They were either available
for but not seeking work (including the so-called
discouraged workers) or seeking work but not
immediately available to work. These two groups
comprise the potential additional labour force. They
fulfil two of the three required criteria to be considered
unemployed – out of work, seeking work, available to
work – and so can be considered to have some
attachment to the labour market. Of the two, the
biggest group is that of individuals available to work but
not seeking work (approximately nine million)
(Figure 3).
Another category of interest – outside the potential
additional labour force definition – are those individuals
who, though not seeking employment and not available
in the next two weeks, indicate that they would
‘nevertheless like to have work’. While it is
understandable that Eurostat should omit this group
from the potential additional labour force, since they
fulfil none of the criteria to be considered unemployed
or employed, their willingness to work implies some
labour market attachment. In 2015, there were over six
million people in this category.
3 An estimate of labour market
slack in the EU  
Figure 3: Total working-age population by employment status (top panel) with close-up on categories of
labour slack (bottom panel), EU, 2015       
Note: Workers aged 15–64 years-old.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)
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The first conclusion is that the ‘halo’ of people (De la
Fuente, 2011) with some labour market attachment is
large, nearly doubling the figure for the unemployed
population as a whole – or more than doubling it if those
expressing a willingness to work are also included.
Unemployment is typically countercyclical, going up
when economic growth goes down or stalls. Since the
global financial crisis in 2008, data for unemployment,
underemployment and the potential additional labour
force have followed similar trajectories (Figure 4). These
latter indicators of labour slack have, however,
exhibited some distinctive trend characteristics
compared with unemployment. Firstly, unemployment
has been more volatile, rising faster post-crisis and then
contracting faster after 2013 when the economic and
labour market recovery strengthened. Unemployment
levels were marginally lower in 2008 than those of the
other categories combined (16.7 million compared with
17.1 million). However, they rose from trough to peak
(2013) by nearly 10 million compared with a 4 million
trough to peak (2014) increase in the underemployed
and potential additional labour force.
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A final specific category of labour slack is that of workers on lay-off or a temporary employer-initiated break from
work, where the employment relationship has been suspended but not severed. Nearly 940,000 workers were on
lay-off in the EU in 2015, an increase of around 25% since 2008. Italy accounted for around 45% of laid-off workers
in the EU in both years.
Lay-offs may arise for a number of reasons, including technical (machinery breakdowns) or economic (slack
demand). The EU-LFS has different ways of categorising workers on lay-off based on whether the employee
continues to draw a wage (and how much as a share of their usual wage) and whether there is a specified date of
return to work (and how far away that is from the reference week). These, in turn, determine the employment
status of the laid-off worker. Where a worker currently not working either has an assurance of a return to work
within three months or continues to receive at least half of their salary from an employer, they are considered
employed. 
More than half (56%) of laid-off workers were considered employed in 2015 (Table 1). Laid-off workers are,
however, considered to be unemployed if they receive less than half of their salary and do not have an assurance
of return to work (or have an agreed date of return more than three months from the date of lay-off) and if they
comply with the other requirements to be considered a job-seeker – namely having sought work in the previous
four weeks and being available to work in the next two weeks. In practice, this series of conditions results in only
a very marginal share of the laid-off being considered unemployed (1%–2%). In all other circumstances, laid-off
workers are considered inactive and these account for the remaining 42%–43%.
It is of particular interest that over 60% of workers on lay-off in 2015 (amounting to 558,000 individuals – the
figures in bold in Table 1) do not appear in any of the previously defined categories of labour slack (shaded in blue
in Table 1). Most of those on short-term lay-off or receiving at least half of their pay are classified as employed.
Many of those who are on longer-term lay-off are classified as inactive but neither seeking, nor available for nor
wishing to work (‘Other inactive’ in Table 1).
Box 1: Workers on lay-off
Table 1: Employment status of workers on lay-off (thousands), EU, 2015       
Laid off with no
return in < 3 months









Employed 0 438 2 440
Employed, involuntary part-time 0 85 0 85
Unemployed 16 0 0 16
Inactive but potential additional labour force 11 0 233 243
Other inactive but willing to work 4 0 32 36
Other inactive 18 0 100 118
Total 49 523 366 938
Note: Due to rounding, some of the totals do not correspond exactly to the sum of the numbers added.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)
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Unemployment is generally characterised as a lagging
indicator. It tends to increase only with some delay after
growth stalls, as employers tend to retain staff in
anticipation of a short-lived downturn, so avoiding the
significant costs of job separations. In this comparison
between official unemployment and other forms of
labour slack, it is unemployment that appears to have
the earliest and most sensitive response to the
economic downturn. Underemployment plus the
potential additional labour force grew as well, but did
so more slowly, and its response to economic
conditions lagged even more than that of
unemployment.
Within the supplementary indicators of unemployment,
the subcategory of those available to work but not
seeking work – including discouraged workers – has
lagged the most. It grew steadily until 2014 before
beginning to contract, a year after unemployment
began to decline. This is likely to reflect inactive
individuals moving ‘off the sidelines’ as labour market
conditions improved and starting to search for and find
jobs. It is a well-documented dynamic of recovering
labour markets that increased labour demand matches
existing job-seekers to new jobs first and only later
attracts back to the labour market some of those who
were previously inactive. The other numerically large
subcategory – involuntary part-timers – has grown
somewhat faster but peaked earlier (in 2012) before
stabilising at around 10 million workers. A tentative
explanation is that, as labour demand began to improve
in 2012–2013, employers initially responded by
increasing the hours of work of those already in work
and wanting to work more hours before increasing the
headcount by taking on new workers; the average
working hours of part-time employees rose from 20.2
hours per week in 2012 to 20.5 in 2015.
Overall, the main observation from Figure 4 is that a
broader measure of labour slack has grown alongside
unemployment since 2008, though not quite at the
same rate and lagging economic activity to a greater
extent. There were 6.1 million more unemployed people
in the EU in 2015 than in 2008 and 3.7 million more
people either underemployed or in the potential
additional labour force.
Involuntary part-time work
One of the most striking developments in European
labour markets in recent decades, accentuated since
the global financial crisis, has been the growing share of
part-time employment. This share now accounts for
some 20% of all jobs in the EU28 (24% in the pre-2004
Member States, the EU15), up from 16% in 1996. The
recent increase in the share of part-time work has been
based, since 2008, on a combination of growing levels of
part-time work and contracting levels of full-time work.
An estimate of labour market slack in the EU
Figure 4: Unemployed, underemployed and potential additional labour force, EU, 2008–2015      
Note: Workers aged 15–64 years-old.
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In part, the explanation is structural. Growing service
sectors tend to have more diversified working time
requirements and tend to employ more part-time
workers. In part, there is also likely to have been a
cyclical component, as employers hire or retain staff on
a part-time basis in a context of reduced labour
demand.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Part-time work itself comes in many varieties, from very short weekly working hours to levels comparable with
full-time work (up to and over 30 hours per week is one conventional cut-off for determining part-time weekly
working hours). Over 3% of those usually working 35 hours per week report themselves as being part-time
workers in the EU-LFS. However, as part-time work has become more common in the past two decades, there has
been an increase in the share of workers working every type of schedule, from very short (up to10 hours) to long,
near full-time hours (31–35 hours per week). 
As Table 2 illustrates, nearly 1 in 20 workers in the EU15 Member States worked 10 hours or fewer a week in 2015.6
Although still a marginal part of overall employment, this share has grown by nearly a third since 1996. It was also
more likely in 2015 to indicate a desire to work a greater number of hours than in 2002 (33% compared with 24%,
EU27 7).
The share of those working such short weekly hours has grown in nearly all Member States. Over the period
1996–2015, notable increases were observed in Austria (from 1.6% to 5.8%), Germany (from 3.5% to 6.9%) and
Denmark (from 6.1% to 9.2%). While women account for the majority of part-time work with very short hours, the
share of men has grown relatively faster since 1996 (from 1.5% to 2.8% of all male workers) compared with
women’s share (from 6.1% to 6.6% of all female workers). Highest shares were recorded among both young
workers (up to 24 years of age) and workers above 64 years of age, and it was in these groups, in particular the
younger group, that the greatest growth in the share of part-time work with very short hours was recorded.
Short hours’ part-time workers are different from other part-time workers in dimensions other than weekly
working hours. Firstly, almost half of them (47%) in the EU26 8 in 2015 did not consider their main labour status to
be that of a worker.9 Over a quarter (26%) said they were students, 9% were retired and the remainder stated they
Box 2: Very short part-time hours
Table 2: Categorisation of workers according to usual weekly working hours, EU15, 1996–2015       
6 Reference is made to the EU15 in order to extend the data series back to the 1990s. It is also the case that part-time shares of employment tend to be
much higher in the older than in the newer Member States.
7 Excluding Germany, for which no data were available for 2002. There are no data for the relevant EU-LFS variable (WISHMORE) in 1996.
8 Data are not available for the main labour status variable (MAINSTAT) for Germany and the UK.
9 The relevant category of the MAINSTAT variable in the EU-LFS is described more precisely as ‘carries out a job or profession, including unpaid work for a
family business or holding, including an apprenticeship or paid traineeship, etc.’. 









≤10 hours 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.6
11–15 hours 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.6
16–20 hours 5.4 5.8 6.1 6.4
21–25 hours 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.5
26–30 hours 3.8 4.3 5.0 5.8
31–35 hours 4.8 10.4 9.4 9.6
36+ hours 77.4 70.2 69.2 66.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Workers aged 15–64 years-old.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)
17
As the part-time share has grown (+2.1 percentage
points, EU28, 2008–2015), so too has that of involuntary
part-timers – those part-timers who indicate they are
ready and willing to work more hours.10 As a share of all
part-timers, the percentage of involuntary part-timers
increased by 1.8 percentage points during 2008–2015.
Underemployment is associated with many of the same
negative outcomes at personal level identified in the
unemployment literature. Dooley and Prause (2004)
identified increased levels of depression and alcohol
abuse and lower self-esteem. Based on an analysis of
UK survey data, Heyes et al (2017) concluded that
increased underemployment was associated with
increased dissatisfaction with workload and with being
‘hours-constrained’ as well as undermining workers’
sense that work allowed them to make use of their
abilities.  
Inadequate income also raises the risk of in-work
poverty, while lower rates of transition to better-quality
jobs (better hours, security or average pay) may have
scarring effects on future employability and work
income.
The country scatterplots shown in Figures 5 to 7 cover a
relatively limited period (2008–2015). They show, first of
all, that the share of part-time work that is involuntary is
not associated with the part-time share of overall
employment at country level (Figure 5). In fact, the
correlation is negative. Countries with high part-time
employment shares such as Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have lower-than-
average shares of involuntary part-time employment. In
countries where part-time work is widespread, and has
been a commonplace of the labour market for some
decades, part-time status appears to be more accepted
and more likely to be voluntary.
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were unemployed or inactive. In addition, the share of those wanting to work longer hours was much greater for
those working short part-time hours compared with those working longer part-time hours.
Interestingly, one in six (16%) of involuntary part-timers working very short hours gave their professional status in
2015 as self-employed. This has increased by four percentage points since 2008. It is not possible to identify other
emerging forms of precarious work (such as zero-hours contracts and platform-based or ‘gig’ work) using existing
EU-LFS questions, but their growth and the growth of very short hours self-employed part-time work are likely to
be significantly overlapping phenomena.
10 Or who indicate that the reason that they are working part time is that they could not find a full-time job. The EU-LFS offers two ways of identifying
involuntary part-time workers, and each provides somewhat different estimates. Of the two alternatives, the approach used here is the one that Eurostat
has adopted in its definition of ‘underemployed part-time workers’, that is, those who self-report as part-time workers, who indicate that they would like
to work more hours and are available to do so. This approach tends to generate lower estimates of the involuntary part-time population. For this reason,
the main reported figures in this report for the involuntary part-time headcount and its increase between 2008 and 2015 can be considered conservative,
lower bound estimates. See Annex 2 for a comparison.
Figure 5: Involuntary part-time employment share and part-time share of total employment, EU Member
States, 2015        
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Where (modest) positive associations are found is in the
change in involuntary part-time employment share and
the change in part-time share (Figure 6). The part-time
share of employment has increased in all but three
Member States (Croatia, Poland and Sweden). Where
this indicator has increased the most since 2008, there
is a greater likelihood that the share of involuntary
part-timers has also increased significantly. Countries
such as Cyprus, Greece and Spain are illustrative of this
association, though there are also some counter-
examples such as Ireland, where the involuntary share
has declined despite an increase of four percentage
points in part-time employment share.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Figure 6: Change in involuntary part-time employment share and in part-time share, EU Member States,
2008–2015        
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Figure 7: Change in involuntary part-time employment share and in unemployment rate, EU Member States,
2008–2015       
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The strongest association, however, is between overall
labour market performance at country level and
changes in the overall share of involuntary part-time
work (Figure 7). Where the unemployment rate has
increased most, there is a strong likelihood that the
involuntary part-time share has also grown strongly.11
Cyprus, Greece and Spain are again illustrative. The
corollary is also true. Germany, the Member State with
the most improved unemployment record over the
period, is also the one with the sharpest decline in
involuntary part-time share.
As a first run, this is a strong indication that involuntary
part-time work is associated with poor labour market
performance in general and moves largely in tandem
with other primary indicators of labour slack such as the
unemployment rate.
In the EU-LFS, respondents are not only asked if they
want to work more hours but also how many hours they
would like to work in total. Involuntary part-time
workers tend to work shorter hours on average than
other part-time workers. The EU average is over one and
a-half hours less a week, but as much as three or more
hours less a week in Belgium, France, Italy and Sweden.
In addition, the desired weekly working hours of
involuntary part-timers tend to be much closer to full-
time working hours than to the average weekly hours of
other part-time workers. This is unsurprising as over
two-thirds of involuntary part-timers (using the
definition adopted in this report, namely those who self-
report as part-time workers, who indicate that they
would like to work longer hours and are available to do
so) indicate that the main reason for working part time
is their inability to find a full-time job. By implication,
they are likely to aspire to work the hours of full-time
counterparts.
Figure 8 shows that the gap between the average
desired hours of work of involuntary part-timers and the
number of usual worked hours decreases as actual
weekly working hours increase. For workers with very
short hours, in particular, the gap is very large. Those
who have worked fewer than 5 hours per week would
like to work between 24 and 28 hours per week. For
those involuntary part-timers working 18 hours and
above per week, desired weekly hours fall into the range
of 34–40 hours per week, effectively full-time work. The
gap between desired and actual weekly hours
converges, therefore, as actual weekly hours approach
full-time hours.
An estimate of labour market slack in the EU
11 A similar finding is observed if the employment rate (sign reversed) is used rather than the unemployment rate (R2 = 0.69). 
Figure 8: Gap between desired and actual hours of work of involuntary part-timers, EU, 2015      
Notes: Usual weekly hours worked includes second jobs where indicated; around 8% of part-timers (involuntary or not) indicated that they have
a second job; desired hours of work (HWWISH) capped at 40 hours a week.
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Table 3 provides confirmation at country level that
desired weekly hours of work of involuntary part-timers
tends to correlate well with their average usual weekly
hours (R2 = 0.80). Desired weekly hours of work tend to
be greatest in some eastern European Member States
(as well as Greece), which generally have longer working
weeks for all workers. They tend to be much shorter in
western European Member States, notably in countries
with shorter average working weeks and with higher
shares of part-time employment (such as Denmark and
the Netherlands). The biggest gaps between average
usual and desired hours of involuntary part-timers are
clearly observed in Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovakia and
Spain. In each country, the gap is bigger than the usual
weekly working hours.
Overall, the gap between hours of work worked and
hours desired amounts to nearly 150 million hours per
week across the EU. This is equivalent to four million
average worker equivalents or nearly 2% of existing EU
employment. Four larger Member States (France,
Germany, Spain and the UK) account for nearly two-
thirds of all of the involuntary part-timers in Europe,
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 































Austria 20.3 33.6 13.3 180.5 2.4 36.8 65.4
Belgium 22.1 35.6 13.5 168.0 2.3 37.0 61.4
Bulgaria 19.8 39.7 19.9 27.3 0.5 40.9 13.3
Croatia 20.6 39.8 19.2 41.9 0.8 39.7 20.2
Cyprus 19.9 38.3 18.3 32.5 0.6 39.6 15.1
Czech Republic 20.8 38.5 17.7 29.9 0.5 40.8 13.0
Denmark 17.3 28.9 11.6 65.9 0.8 33.5 22.8
Estonia 21.8 38.2 16.4 7.7 0.1 38.9 3.2
Finland 18.0 32.8 14.8 94.0 1.4 37.0 37.5
France 22.1 33.8 11.7 1,848.6 21.5 37.5 574.9
Germany 19.3 33.8 14.5 1,550.9 22.4 35.5 631.3
Greece 20.7 39.1 18.4 242.4 4.5 42.1 106.0
Hungary 22.3 39.6 17.3 67.1 1.2 39.9 29.1
Ireland 19.2 36.1 16.9 109.7 1.9 35.9 51.8
Italy 18.5 36.0 17.4 742.1 12.9 37.0 349.6
Latvia 21.2 38.2 17.0 26.0 0.4 39.2 11.3
Lithuania 21.4 38.8 17.4 22.4 0.4 38.5 10.1
Luxembourg 18.2 30.8 12.7 6.3 0.1 37.6 2.1
Malta 22.2 36.5 14.3 4.2 0.1 38.6 1.5
Netherlands 17.5 30.6 13.2 573.0 7.5 30.4 248.6
Poland 22.6 38.5 15.8 318.1 5.0 40.9 123.1
Portugal 18.4 38.1 19.8 231.0 4.6 40.0 114.1
Romania 24.0 39.9 15.9 267.1 4.2 40.0 106.3
Slovakia 17.3 38.2 20.9 57.8 1.2 40.3 30.1
Slovenia 20.0 37.6 17.7 31.2 0.6 39.4 14.0
Spain 18.3 38.4 20.1 1,497.2 30.1 37.8 797.6
Sweden 22.7 36.5 13.8 208.7 2.9 36.8 78.1
UK 19.8 31.9 12.1 1,398.8 16.9 37.3 454.5
EU 19.9 35.0 15.2 9,850.3 149.3 37.4 3,993.1
Notes: Usual and desired hours based on EU-LFS annual microdata 2015; desired hours of work (HWWISH) capped at 40 hours a week.
AWEs = average worker equivalents. The last column – thousands of average worker equivalents – represents the total volume of work desired
but not worked by involuntary part-timers and is calculated as a simple ratio of the previous two columns in each country, that is, total weekly
hours desired but not worked / average weekly hours (all workers), in the specific country. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations) 
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and each of these countries also makes a
disproportionate contribution to the aggregate hours
gap. In Spain, this gap amounts to the equivalent of
800,000 jobs.
To identify what categories of worker are more likely to
fall into the category of involuntary part-timers, Table 4
compares workers with different personal and work
characteristics according to the share of overall
employment, part-time employment and involuntary
part-time work in the EU. This is a static, descriptive
analysis based on the EU-LFS 2015 annual data.
Nearly four out of five part-time workers in the EU are
women, but among involuntary part-time workers, the
gender imbalance is not so marked, indicating a
stronger likelihood that part-time men fall into the
category rather than part-time women. Nonetheless,
there are twice as many involuntary female part-timers
in the EU than involuntary male part-timers. Younger
workers, less educated workers and, especially, workers
new to their current job (tenure of less than one year) or
those on temporary contracts are more likely to be
involuntary part-time workers. Attachment to the
labour market is therefore precarious across several
dimensions for involuntary part-timers – both
contractually, in terms of human capital endowment,
and in terms of accumulated work experience, in
general and in the current job.
The fact that younger workers are more likely to report
involuntary part-time employment adds an additional
layer of youth underemployment to the more remarked
trend of high youth unemployment. In their analysis of
underemployment in the UK, Bell and Blanchflower
An estimate of labour market slack in the EU
Table 4: Share of overall employment, voluntary part-time and involuntary part-time, by personal and work










Sex Male 53.9 21.8 33.5
Female 46.1 78.2 66.5
Age 15–24 years 8.5 13.3 15.4
25–39 years 35.3 29.1 35.9
40–54 years 40.3 37.4 36.9
55–64 years 16.0 20.1 11.8
Education Lower secondary 18.0 21.4 27.7
Upper secondary 48.4 50.0 47.1
Tertiary 33.5 28.7 25.2
Tenure < 12 months 13.6 17.9 31.9
1–5 years 24.3 26.1 31.8
> 5 years 62.1 56.0 36.3
Contract type* Permanent 85.9 83.5 63.7
Temporary 14.1 16.5 36.3
Selected sectors
(high prevalence)
Activities of households as employer 1.1 2.5 5.6
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.8 2.7 3.6
Accommodation and food service activities 4.7 7.3 10.4
Administrative and support service activities 4.2 6.2 8.9
Selected sectors
(low prevalence)
Manufacturing 15.7 6.4 4.1
Financial and insurance activities 3.0 2.4 0.9
Construction 6.8 2.4 3.3
Selected occupations
(high prevalence)
Elementary occupations 9.1 16.1 26.5
Service and sales workers 17.0 26.8 30.1
Selected occupations
(low prevalence)
Managers 5.9 2.2 0.9
Craft and related trades workers 11.8 3.2 4.9
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 7.4 2.4 3.3
* Employees only 
Note: ‘Don’t knows’ and ‘Not applicable’ omitted from calculations. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 annual microdata  
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(2013) observed that the desire for extra working hours
is greatest among younger workers and weakest, indeed
negative in absolute terms, among older workers, who
would prefer on average to work fewer hours. There is
room therefore for policies encouraging the adaptation
of actual working times to the working time preferences
for the two age groups. One example of such a policy is
partial or phased retirement in the case of older
workers, possibly accompanied by mentoring
possibilities where younger workers are assigned to
older workers nearing retirement.
An imbalance is also reflected in the prevalence of
involuntary part-timers in specific occupations.
Generally, lower-paid service occupations – elementary
occupations and sales and service workers – account for
57% of all involuntary part-time employment but
around one-quarter of total employment (26%).
Managers, on the other hand, are much less likely to be
working part-time and, if working part-time, to be doing
so involuntarily.
Sector-wise, traditionally male-employing sectors such
as manufacturing and construction combine a
prevalence of full-time employment with very low
shares of involuntary part-time employment. This is
interesting as it implies that the disproportionately high
male share of involuntary part-timers is concentrated in
service sector employment. A gender-disaggregated
breakdown by occupation (not shown in Table 4)
confirms that this is the case; the retail sector and the
accommodation and food services sector are both
predominantly female-employing sectors but are also
those that account for the highest shares of involuntary
part-time employment among male workers.
Of the other service sectors with high shares of
involuntary part-time employment, the most important
is administrative and support service activities, a broad
grouping that includes private security, services to
buildings (including cleaning and facilities support) as
well as call centres. The highest likelihood of being an
involuntary part-time worker is in domestic
employment, working for individual householders,
which accounts for just over 1% of all workers but 6% of
all involuntary part-timers. This sector has a large
majority of female workers.
Using the rather basic work income measure in the EU-
LFS (an income decile assignment by country based on
monthly take-home pay from the main job), it can be
seen that 73% of involuntary part-timers are in the
bottom 20% of the wage distribution. A combination of
employment in sectors and occupations with low hourly
pay and insufficient working hours are a recipe for
working poverty. Though the ordinal wage measure
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Table 5: Determinants of involuntary part-time employment, EU, 2015     
Notes: Selected outputs from a logit model. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. n.s. = not
significant. Dependent variable: involuntary part-time status. Model 1: Compared with all other employed. Model 2: Compared to all other part-
timers (that is, voluntary part-timers). 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)  






Temporary Permanent 2.124*** 1.672***
Education
Tertiary Second level completed 0.895*** n.s.
Occupation
Sales and service workers Technician/associate
professional
2.100*** 1.594***





55–64 years 0.938* 0.617***
Sex





Arts and entertainment 1.869*** 1.275***





5+ years 0.525*** 0.605***
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used in the EU-LFS does not allow any formal
measurement of (in-work) poverty to be derived, it does
provide strong circumstantial evidence that inadequate
work income is an important driver of the desire to work
longer hours among involuntary part-timers.
Supplementing the above summary based on tabular,
descriptive data, two logit models have been estimated
to assess the extent to which some of the above
variables are important determinants of involuntary
part-time status while controlling for the other variables
and resulting composition effects (Table 5). A brief
summary of the most important results follows (full
outputs are available on request from the authors).
The multivariate analysis reinforces some of the
findings of the descriptive analysis, but falsifies some of
the others. It confirms that being of temporary status,
working in lower-level service occupations (sales and
service workers and, especially, elementary
occupations) or similar sectors (households as
employers) as well as having only started one’s current
job within the last year are all factors associated with a
higher prevalence of involuntary part-time work.
Conversely, being of long tenure or working in a
predominantly male-employing sector such as
manufacturing (also utilities and construction) is
associated with a lower prevalence of involuntary part-
time work.
While having a graduate-level education provides a
(modest) level of protection against involuntary part-
time status compared with those who completed
secondary education in the full model (where all
employees is the population), this effect becomes
insignificant in the part-time only model.
Controlling for the other variables, women are much
more likely to self-report as involuntary part-time
workers than men in the full model, reflecting women’s
predominance in part-time work overall. When,
however, the population is restricted to just the part-
timers (Model 2), the reverse is the case; it is men who
are more likely than women to self-report as involuntary
part-timers.
Finally, while older workers (55–64 years-old) are less
likely to work part-time involuntarily compared with the
reference category (25–39 years-old), this is also
surprisingly the case for younger workers (15–24 years-
old). One possible explanation is that the main factor
predisposing individuals to self-report involuntary part-
time status is low tenure rather than age.
Inactivity
A far larger share of the jobless or non-employed is
inactive as opposed to unemployed. In the population
of working age, there are around four inactive people
for every one unemployed person, and this ratio has
tended to decrease as labour market participation has
increased. In 2015, there were 2.5 million more
unemployed people in the EU than in 2002, but 9 million
fewer inactive people of working age. 
In comparisons of the relative labour market
performance of the EU and the USA since the global
financial crisis, one of the more interesting – but less
remarked upon – phenomena has been the
outperformance of the EU as regards labour market
participation. The share of job-holders and job-seekers
combined as a proportion of the total working-age
population has increased every year since 2002 (from
68.6% to 72.5%), by an average of 0.4 percentage points
in higher growth years but also by 0.1–0.2 percentage
points even during the 2008–2010 period of sharp
recession. Recent analysis has suggested one
mechanism supporting increasing participation rates in
times of cyclical downturn: the mobilisation into labour
market activity of second or third earners in a
household when a primary earner loses their job
(European Commission, 2016a, p. 11). This ‘additional
worker effect’ is consistent with the observation that
participation rates for core-age individuals rose most for
those in the lowest household income quartile.
Inactivity may in many cases be a voluntary or even a
desired status. In 2015, 36% of inactive people gave
participation in education or training as their main
reason for not seeking work (an increasing share
compared with previous years); 15% were retired, while
16% cited family or caring responsibilities. Both of these
shares were decreasing, as women – still the main
carers – and older people were increasingly likely to be
in the market for paid work.
Available to work but not seeking work
However, over one in six inactive people in the EU– or
over 15 million working-age individuals – indicated a
wish to work in the 2015 EU-LFS. The majority of these
fall into the first main category of the potential
additional labour force – those willing and available to
work but not seeking it. There were 8.8 million such
individuals in 2015 (Table 6).
An estimate of labour market slack in the EU
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There is little correlation between general labour
market indicators such as the employment or
unemployment rate at national level and the share of
those who are inactive, not seeking work but available
and willing to work. Italy alone has nearly 3.5 million
working-age individuals available but not seeking work
– more than one in three of the EU total – but a country
such as Greece, with much higher unemployment, has a
much lower share. This suggests that specificities of
national employment regimes – and possibly also
differences in the survey categorisation of inactive
individuals across Member States – affect this share
more than labour market or economic performance. As
already indicated (Figure 4), this category of inactivity
has grown by over 1.5 million people since 2008, though
it has begun to decline since 2014.
The most important reason that those inactive people
willing and available to work are not seeking work –
reported by 36% – is their belief that no work is
available. These inactive people are also referred to as
‘discouraged workers’,12 those that have given up
searching for a job and have thus exited unemployment
to become inactive. Their availability and willingness to
work means, however, that they remain ‘marginally
attached’ to the labour market. Their discouragement is
subjective, but one could expect a strong correlation
between this measure and other measures of objective
labour market conditions, such as the employment or
unemployment rate. Again, in the simple cross-country
comparison (Table 6), there is only a very weak positive
association (R2 = 0.06) between unemployment rates
and discouraged worker share. Italy accounts for an
even higher share of discouraged workers – nearly half
of the EU total – despite having an unemployment rate
only somewhat higher than the EU average. Spain,
however, is an example of a country where high
unemployment is mirrored in a high share of
discouraged workers – there were almost 400,000 of
them in 2015.
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Table 6: Inactive people available for but not seeking work, EU Member States, 2015    
Note: Workers aged 15–64 years-old. In colour-coded columns, highest values are gradations of red, middle values of yellow and lowest values
of green.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)  
Available but not 
seeking work 




Austria 139.4                               9.9  3.7  0.3  
Belgium 85.5                                  3.6  22.2  0.9  
Bulgaria 217.6                               15.2 170.8  11.9  
Croaa 150.6                               16.2 33.7  3.6  
Cyprus 17.8                                  12.2 7.4  5.1  
Czech Republic 34.7                                  1.9  5.9  0.3  
Denmark 40.6                                  5.2  1.2  0.2  
Estonia 22.4                                  11.2 5.1  2.6  
Finland 108.4                               12.8 34.9  4.1  
France 747.7                               6.3  188.2  1.6  
Germany 471.3                               3.9  62.0  0.5  
Greece 95.2                                  4.2  21.3  0.9  
Hungary 139.3                               6.8  66.1  3.2  
Ireland 21.9                                  2.4  10.2  1.1  
Italy 3,450.9                            24.6 1,611.8 11.5  
Latvia 38.9                                  12.6 13.9  4.5  
Lithuania 12.2                                  2.4  3.8  0.8  
Luxembourg 14.2                                  12.8 0.9  0.9  
Malta 2.0                                    2.2  0.1  0.1  
Netherlands 301.8                               13.6 71.9  3.2  
Poland 533.4                               6.7  256.7  3.2  
Portugal 243.0                               13.5 90.7  5.1  
Romania 355.7                               7.8  71.8  1.6  
Slovakia 51.9                                  4.7  15.8  1.4  
Slovenia 25.4                                  6.5 11.2  2.9  
Spain 954.2                               12.2 375.4  4.8  
Sweden 109.3                               9.7  14.8  1.3  
UK 400.3                               4.1  12.5  0.1  
EU 8,785.7                            9.7  3,183.9 3.5  
Discouraged 
% of inacve
12 Measures of discouraged workers are not always harmonised across countries and depend on the particular questions asked in labour force surveys. In
the USA, for example, one specific condition of being included in the category is that a job search has been undertaken in the previous 12 months (but not
in the previous 4 weeks). There is no question in the EU-LFS that makes it possible to gauge whether a job search has taken place over the previous 12
months, so the operationalisation of discouraged workers in this report is broader and less exclusive. It refers to those without a job who are willing to
work, available to work (in the next two weeks) but have not undertaken a job search in the previous four weeks. 
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The share of discouraged workers among those
available but not seeking work was more or less the
same for women as for men (37% and 36%,
respectively), but there were significant gender
differences in the shares of other cited reasons for not
seeking work. Women were much more likely to cite
family or caring responsibilities (21% among women,
6% among men) but less likely to cite illness or disability
(5% compared with 8%) or participation in education or
training (10% compared with 14%).
Regarding the composition of the two categories in
focus in this section – inactive, available but not seeking
work and the subgroup of discouraged workers –
Table 7 allows the categories to be characterised by the
extent to which they differ in personal and (previous)
work-related characteristics compared with the
unemployed population and the inactive population.
One of the implicit assumptions of the labour
underutilisation literature – and the potential additional
labour force concept that it underpins – is that the
identified categories represent a grey zone between
inactivity and unemployment and that they share many
attributes with the population of job-seekers. Based on
this assumption, it might be expected to find population
characteristics for the group(s) that differ from those of
the inactive population more generally and
approximate more those of the unemployed. The first
step in this analysis is to compare the fifth column in
Table 7 (inactive people available for but not seeking
work, hereafter referred to as ‘target group’) with the
third and fourth columns.
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Sex Male 53.5 39.5 42.2 41.6
Female 46.5 60.5 57.8 58.4
Age 15–24 years 20.5 35.8 20.0 11.1
25–39 years 37.3 16.2 29.3 24.7
40–54 years 30.8 17.4 32.4 38.8
55–64 years 11.4 30.6 18.3 25.5
Education Lower secondary 36.8 46.6 45.8 55.2
Upper secondary 43.9 41.5 41.7 37.4
Tertiary 19.3 12.0 12.5 7.3
When last worked Never employed 18.8 45.2 30.6 27.7
< 12 months 34.1 9.2 19.6 13.2
12–47 months 25.4 13.1 17.6 18.1




Dismissed 34.7 15.6 33.1 43.2
Job of limited duration ended 43.7 17.0 39.5 39.9
Family or caring responsibilities 3.8 10.9 5.4 2.7
Own illness or disability 2.9 14.1 4.5 2.5




Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.2 4.6 7.0 9.1 (4.2)
Manufacturing 14.7 16.5 14.9 17.2 (15.6)
Construction 12.2 7.0 10.6 12.4 (6.8)
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 16.9 14.5 15.9 15.7 (14.0)




Service and sales workers 23.9 22.6 25.0 22.1 (17.0)
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing 1.8 2.8 2.8 4.0 (3.5)
Craft and related trades workers 15.4 12.1 14.6 17.8 (11.8)
Elementary occupations 22.1 16.6 23.4 27.2 (9.1)
Note: 2015 share of total employment by sector and occupation in parentheses for comparison.
Source: EU-LFS 2015 (authors’ calculations)   
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The sex and educational attainment share of the target
group is much more akin to that of the broader inactive
category than the unemployed population, with a
higher share of women and a higher share of people
with low educational attainment. The reverse is true of
the age profile. Here, the target group does resemble
that of the unemployed population, although the high
share of inactivity among the younger group due to
educational participation and among the older age
group due to retirement skews this comparison. For
example, those younger people available but not
seeking work are presumably less likely to be in full-
time education. The share of older workers is somewhat
higher in the target group, but with a preponderance
among the middle-aged (40–54 years-old) rather than
the older age category (55–64 years-old). In terms of
when they last worked, the target group’s labour
market attachment falls somewhere between the
unemployed and inactive populations; they are much
less likely never to have worked before than the inactive
in general, but also more likely to have been out of work
for a long period (four years or more) than the
unemployed. The one area in which the target group
resembles most the composition of the unemployed
population is in relation to the reasons given for loss of
their last job, which are mainly business-initiated
(dismissal or redundancy and non-renewal of limited
duration work). The inactive population more generally
cite a broader range of reasons including retirement,
own illness or disability and caring responsibilities.
Finally, the target group is more likely to report having
last worked in agriculture, construction (both
contracting sectors in terms of employment in the
period before the survey) and food and accommodation
services (a high turnover sector) – in each case, the
share indicated is higher than for the inactive
population as a whole and closer to that of the
unemployed population. By occupation in their last job,
the target population is similar in composition to the
unemployed, notably as regards the high share of blue
collar occupations cited (both higher skilled and lower
skilled). In terms of their most recent work experience,
the target population is more likely to have worked in
high-turnover or contracting sectors as well as in lower-
skilled occupations.
Overall, the data provide some support for the
contention that the target group is distinct from the
inactive population more generally and resembles that
of the job-seeking population in some key respects –
principally in relation to the characteristics of previous
employment.
Table 7 also allows a preliminary assessment to be
made of how the subgroup of discouraged workers
differs from the other broader inactive categories of
which it is part. In hierarchies of labour market
attachment, the group of discouraged workers tends to
rank high with stronger labour market attachment than
all other forms of inactivity (see, for example, ILO, 2008,
p. 21). This has been the justification, for example, for
including discouraged workers in the first additional
‘broad unemployment’ measure covered by the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U-4 rate. This is the
category of the inactive considered closest to the labour
market and most similar in profile to job-seekers.
However, earlier analysis of labour slack found that the
attachment of many discouraged workers to the labour
market was even less than marginal, with little recent
work experience and high levels of persistence in non-
employment (OECD, 1995).
A comparison of the third, fourth and fifth columns of
Table 7 shows that recent EU-LFS data do support a
sceptical view of the labour market attachment of
discouraged workers. They are more likely to have been
out of work for a longer period than the broader group
to which they belong, that is, those who are inactive,
available but not seeking work; 41% have not worked in
the previous four years and a further 28% have never
worked. They also have an older age profile – nearly
two-thirds are over 40 – and tend to have lower levels of
educational attainment. This could imply that their lack
of job search is in part motivated by problems of
obsolete skills or age discrimination in the labour
market rather than the common explanation of
discouragement based on business cycle effects
(reduced labour demand in a downturn). Discouraged
workers are also more likely to have lost their last jobs
for economic reasons (dismissal or redundancy or
ending of a job of limited duration) and their last jobs
were disproportionately in contracting sectors (such as
agriculture) or in low-skilled elementary occupations.
In terms of composition, the discouraged workers group
appears to face more, not fewer, labour market
challenges than the broader category of inactive,
available but not seeking work, and more even than the
inactive population more generally. The traditional view
that they are a source of reserve labour easily mobilised
as a labour market emerges from a downturn is, on this
evidence, hard to justify. As a group, they appear to
share more in common with the long-term unemployed
and to be less, not more, attached to the labour market
than other inactive categories.
Table 8 shows selected results after testing some of the
descriptive findings above using a multivariate model to
isolate which of the identified factors predispose to
discouragement and other specific inactive categories
when controlling for the other factors. Specifically, a
multinomial logistic regression is estimated to identify
prevalent characteristics of three inactive categories
(the discouraged, the inactive who are available but not
seeking work for reasons other than discouragement,
and a third residual group of other inactive people,
which includes those not wishing to work, namely those
voluntarily inactive) against the baseline non-
employment category of the unemployed. The
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coefficients of the model express the relative risk ratios
of a non-employed person falling into one of the three
indicated inactive categories compared with
unemployment based on the categories of the
covariates. The covariates cover personal
characteristics (age, sex, education level) as well as
labour market history characteristics (when last
worked, reason for leaving last job, occupation and
sector of last job).
A sample interpretation from the coefficients table is
that the relative risk of being a discouraged worker
rather than unemployed would be expected to increase
by a factor of 1.33 for a woman compared with a man,
holding the other variables in the model constant.
Table 8 confirms again the importance of labour market
detachment in pushing individuals into inactivity and
especially into discouragement; the longer the time
elapsed since working, the more likely it is that the non-
employed will have left the labour market altogether.
For those who gave their reason for leaving their last job
as retirement (early or normal), the expected increased
risk of being in the other (mainly voluntary) inactive
category is observed but also an increased risk of being
discouraged – relating mainly to those who have taken
early retirement but still wish to work. Leaving work for
reasons of illness or disability or because of family or
caring responsibilities makes no difference in
determining whether an individual becomes
discouraged as opposed to unemployed, but they do
substantially raise the risk of being in other forms of
inactivity compared with unemployment. Sector or
occupation in the last job worked are generally less
important determinants, though discouragement is
more prevalent among those whose last job was in
agriculture – a sector in secular decline.
In terms of personal characteristics, higher levels of
educational attainment make it less likely that an
individual becomes discouraged rather than
unemployed. Women are more likely than men to be
An estimate of labour market slack in the EU
Table 8: Determinants of various non-employment statuses, EU, 2015    
Covariate and category Reference category
Base category: unemployed
Inactive, available not


















Tertiary 0.700*** n.s. 0.909***
Sector of last job
Agriculture Retail 1.453*** 1.534*** 1.722***




Craft and trade worker n.s. n.s. 0.848***
Plant and machine operator n.s. n.s. 0.825***
Elementary occupation 1.216** n.s. 0.805***
Reason for leaving last job
Family or caring responsibilities
Dismissal or made redundant
n.s 2.474*** 6.926***
Own illness or disability n.s 2.990*** 13.43***





24–47 months ago 1.942*** 1.167*** 1.573***
4+ years ago 2.519*** 1.448*** 2.221***
Notes: Selected coefficients from a multinomial logit model. Exponentiated coefficients (relative risk ratios). * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, 
*** = p < 0.001. n.s. = not significant. Baseline outcome: unemployment.  
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)   
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discouraged rather than unemployed, controlling for
each of the other variables, but even more likely to be in
the other inactive category, reflecting the greater share
of working women who are absent from the labour
market due to caring responsibilities. Finally, there is an
important age gradient in the relative risk of being
discouraged rather than unemployed with the highest
risk among 55–64 year-olds.
In summary, the multivariate analysis confirms how
distinctive are the inactive discouraged from the
unemployed. They are more likely to be older and
female, with generally lower levels of educational
attainment and greater detachment from the labour
market as measured by time elapsed since they last
worked.
Seeking work but not available to work
The third and smallest category of the potential
additional labour force, by numbers of individuals, is
that of inactive people who are seeking work but not
available to work. There were just over two million such
individuals in 2015. The category comprises a number of
distinct subgroups, but the main component are those
who have actively sought work during the last four
weeks but are not available for work in the next two
weeks. Of the other smaller subgroups in this category,
two refer to ‘future starters’, those who have found a job
starting within or after the next three months. By
definition, these groups have high labour market
attachment and are best considered as representing a
form of frictional unemployment, despite being
classified as inactive. There were around half a million
such individuals in 2015.
For the category as a whole, the main reasons given for
not being available for work are the completion of
education or training (26%), personal or family
responsibilities (21%) and illness or disability (17%). In
terms of composition, the category is predominantly
female (55%), younger than the general inactive
population and with more recent work experience. It is
also more likely to have higher levels of education than
either the unemployed or inactive, but this is probably
related to the high share of those citing education or
training as their reason for unavailability.
Country-level estimates for those inactive people who
are seeking but not available to work are included in the
summary table (Table 9) in the next section. The
detailed breakdown by country is given in Annex 3. This
brings together data on the three main categories
covered in this report and combines them with
unemployment data for a more comprehensive
indicator of labour slack for each Member State.
Country-level summary
The unemployment rate is calculated as the
unemployed divided by the total labour force (in other
words, the unemployed plus the employed). Table 9
presents a detailed analysis of the 2015 annual EU-LFS
microdata, which calculates an analogous labour slack
rate for different Member States, based on the previous
descriptive analysis using the potential additional
labour force categories. It is the sum of the unemployed,
the extra work hours desired by involuntary part-timers
(converted into a headcount measure of ‘average
worker equivalents’ based on the average usual hours
of work in each country) and the two potential
additional labour force categories as a share of the total
labour force plus the potential additional labour force.
In all countries, the labour slack rate is greater than the
unemployment rate but with wide variations in the gap
across countries. Similar data for 2008 are given in
Annex 1.




















Austria 4,068 251 65 40 139 5.8 10.9
Belgium 4,499 421 61 53 86 8.6 12.1
Bulgaria 2,971 303 13 20 218 9.2 15.7
Croatia 1,564 309 20 12 151 16.5 23.9
Cyprus 350 63 15 3 18 15.2 21.9
Czech Republic 4,891 267 13 18 35 5.2 6.4
Denmark 2,678 180 23 21 41 6.3 9.0
Estonia 613 41 3 3 22 6.3 10.2
Finland 2,372 250 37 58 108 9.5 16.1
France 26,065 3,050 575 298 748 10.5 15.2
Germany 39,741 1,946 631 486 471 4.7 8.2
Table 9: Summary of labour force categories and unemployment and labour slack rates, EU Member States, 2015
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At aggregate EU level, the unmet labour demand
represented by the labour slack categories would have
been equivalent to an additional 5.5 percentage points
beyond that represented by the unemployment rate. By
some margin, the biggest gap is in Italy where the
labour slack rate is almost double the official
unemployment rate. This arises principally as a result of
high levels of inactive people available but not seeking
work, including high levels of discouraged workers.
The gap is also somewhat greater than average in some
Mediterranean countries – Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal and
Spain – as well as Bulgaria, Finland and the Netherlands
(due mainly to relatively high numbers of involuntary
part-time workers).
In Greece, on the other hand, there is little additional
labour slack over and above that indicated by the
unemployment rate. But there was still enough to bring
the overall labour slack rate to nearly 29% of the
working-age population – as also in the case of Spain.
Other countries where additional labour slack appears
to be less of a concern include the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Lithuania and Malta, while two other larger
Member States with comparatively positive labour
market performance in the post-crisis period – Germany
and the UK – both have below-average unemployment
rates and modest levels of additional slack (+3.5
percentage points and +3.4 percentage points,
respectively).
The unemployment rate increased by 2.4 percentage
points at aggregate EU level between 2008 and 2015,
while the labour slack rate increased by 3.1 percentage
points (Table 10).13 This average concealed widely
different paths at Member State level, though in the
majority of Member States, increased unemployment
rates were accompanied by even greater increases in
labour slack.
In the three countries that recorded declining
unemployment over this period (Germany, Hungary and
the UK), the measure of broader unemployment also
declined or remained stable. The performance of
Germany is especially noteworthy in unemployment,
having moved from being above the EU average pre-
crisis rate to being the EU’s best performer in 2015, and
also in reducing labour slack more generally. It was the




















Greece 3,548 1,190 106 41 95 25.1 28.8
Hungary 4,176 307 29 9 139 6.8 10.4
Ireland 1,899 202 52 13 22 9.6 13.2
Italy 21,973 3,024 350 103 3,451 12.1 24.0
Latvia 868 97 11 5 39 10.1 15.0
Lithuania 1,301 134 10 11 12 9.3 11.4
Luxembourg 257 19 2 8 14 6.8 14.3
Malta 182 11 2 0 2 5.5 7.3
Netherlands 8,123 603 249 156 302 6.9 13.9
Poland 15,812 1,300 123 102 533 7.6 11.5
Portugal 4,309 640 114 23 243 12.9 19.1
Romania 8,235 623 106 4 356 7.0 11.7
Slovakia 2,405 314 30 14 52 11.5 14.6
Slovenia 902 90 14 4 25 9.1 12.9
Spain 17,697 5,052 798 203 954 22.2 28.4
Sweden 4,660 384 78 107 109 7.6 12.7
UK 30,113 1,748 454 332 400 5.5 8.9
EU 216,271 22,820 3,993 2,145 8,786 9.5 14.9
Note: Those aged 15–64 years-old. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)  
13 Malta is excluded as data are not available for 2008.
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country in which the decline was greatest
(-4.2 percentage points). One indication of just how
distinctive German labour market performance was
over this period is that the population of involuntary
part-timers shrank by 900,000 even as it grew by 3.3
million in the remaining Member States. Also on the
positive side, the Czech Republic combined low
unemployment with only marginal levels of labour slack
both at the beginning and end of the period covered.
The change in the labour slack rate was greatest in
Cyprus, Greece and Spain; the gap between
unemployment and labour slack has also been at the
higher end of the range in all of the countries in the
EU–International Monetary Fund assistance
programmes, suggestive of additional labour slack in
these countries over and above generally high headline
unemployment rates.
In summary, with very few exceptions (notably
Germany), labour slack has grown since 2008, and its
expansion represents an additional 2.4 million potential
workers that can be added to the 6.1 million extra
unemployed people in the EU28 in 2015 compared with
pre-crisis. Finally, even as labour market conditions
have improved (since 2013), this has been more evident
in terms of official measurement of unemployment,
rather than in terms of additional labour slack as
measured in this report. One conclusion is that relying
exclusively on the unemployment rate as a proxy of
labour slack is likely to paint too positive a picture of the
current performance of European labour markets. There
were still many more working-age individuals in 2015 on
the sidelines of the labour market, willing to work but
not working, than there were in 2008.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 










Austria 4.2 8.9 5.8 10.9
Belgium 7.0 9.4 8.6 12.1
Bulgaria 5.7 11.6 9.2 15.7
Croatia 8.7 14.3 16.5 23.9
Cyprus 3.8 6.0 15.2 21.9
Czech Republic 4.4 5.5 5.2 6.4
Denmark 3.5 6.1 6.3 9.0
Estonia 5.6 8.8 6.3 10.2
Finland 6.4 11.0 9.5 16.1
France 7.3 11.6 10.5 15.2
Germany 7.5 12.4 4.7 8.2
Greece 7.9 9.8 25.1 28.8
Hungary 7.9 11.8 6.8 10.4
Ireland 6.5 8.2 9.6 13.2
Italy 6.8 16.7 12.1 24.0
Latvia 8.0 13.1 10.1 15.0
Lithuania 5.9 10.1 9.3 11.4
Netherlands 3.0 7.0 6.9 13.9
Poland 7.2 11.5 7.6 11.5
Portugal 8.0 10.2 12.9 19.1
Romania 6.1 9.6 7.0 11.7
Slovakia 9.5 11.6 11.5 14.6
Slovenia 4.5 6.6 9.1 12.9
Spain 11.3 16.4 22.2 28.4
Sweden 6.3 11.2 7.6 12.7
UK 5.7 8.9 5.5 8.9
EU 7.1 11.8 9.5 14.9
Notes: Malta omitted due to missing data for 2008; Luxembourg omitted due to data breaks. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)  
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The descriptive analysis so far has consisted of an
analysis of labour slack, based mainly on the most
recent available year of annual EU-LFS microdata (2015)
as well as some recent trend data going back to 2008, to
show the effects of the global financial crisis and its
aftermath. But, more generally in the labour market and
over a longer period, structural changes have been
taking place in labour market participation, with
implications for any assessment of labour slack. For
example, over the period 1998–2015, the working-age
employment rate in the EU15 14 increased by
4.9 percentage points (from 61.2% to 66.1%) in spite of
demographic trends that would have predicted a
declining employment rate – as the population has aged
and employment rates for older people tend to be
lower. The reason that there are more potential workers
now than two decades ago is that the extensive and
structural labour slack that existed for certain
categories has gradually eroded. The probability of
non-employment has tended to decrease for many
specific age–sex groups, notably for older people (both
sexes) as well as core-age women over the past 20 years.
For some other groups, however, it has increased.
A long-term decline in the participation and
employment rates for core-age men has been
highlighted in the USA (Council of Economic Advisers,
2016; Eberstadt, 2016), and a similar phenomenon
appears to have occurred in the EU, though not quite to
the dramatic extent observed in the USA.
The Great Recession, in particular, with its
disproportionate impact on male-employing sectors,
has further weakened labour market attachment for
many men. A coincident and possibly related trend has
been the increasing share of inactivity attributed to
disability or illness; this has been marked among core-
age men. This chapter describes some of these
longer-term trends and sets out possible explanatory
factors to draw out some of the relevant national policy,
institutional or demographic factors in those countries
with high rates of inactivity resulting from
discouragement or disability.
Changes in employment rate by
age and sex
Figure 9 disaggregates the employment rate change
between 1998 and 2015 (in the EU15) into the separate
contributions by age–sex group. It describes a period of
rapid workforce ageing and also of gender convergence.
Younger workers (aged 15–24) are the only group to
have experienced a negative employment change in
both sex groups. This overall decrease relates mainly to
increased participation of this group in education and
training. As a consequence, the Europe 2020 strategic
objective for third-level educational attainment (40% of
30–35 year-olds to have achieved such a level) is likely
to be met in advance of the 2020 deadline. Of course, to
the extent that this decline in the youth employment
rate is attributable to extended periods of education, it
is an increase in ‘good’ inactivity, with positive long-
term implications for the stock of human capital. It is,
however, also the case that the long recessionary period
(2008–2013) saw a steep rise in youth unemployment
and inactivity. Youth non-employment – especially that
of so-called NEETs (not in education, employment or
training), where the disengagement is from both the
world of work and of education – is clearly an important
dimension of labour slack with longer-term scarring
effects both for the individuals affected and for
aggregate labour market performance. Data also show
that, mainly as a consequence of the crisis, young
people have tended to remain in education longer
before joining the labour market (Eurostat, 2015).
Taking shelter in education as an alternative to
searching for work in a labour market with limited
labour demand can be considered another
manifestation of labour slack.
4 Changes in labour market
participation  
14 EU15 figures cited for longer time series going back to 1998 because of the unavailability of data for all current EU28 Member States. The main trends
identified by age–sex group are in any case similar across older and newer Member States.
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A strong contrast exists between the employment rate
shift contributions of core-age men (traditionally a
mainstay of the labour force) and core-age women,
‘core age’ being 25–54 years. Women contributed
positively (+2.7 percentage points) while men
contributed negatively (-1.3 percentage points). While
the employment gaps are closing, they are still notable,
with an employment rate gap of 11.6 percentage points
between women (72.2%) and men (83.8%) aged 25–54
in 2015. The differences are decreasing over time but
with a strong heterogeneity among European countries
(Eurofound, 2016).
Another interesting trend is the strong increase in the
employment rates of male and female older workers
(more pronounced in the case of women). The higher
participation of older workers – the result of
demographic ageing and of individuals in these groups
remaining longer in the labour force – offset the decline
of young people (15–24 years-old) and the stagnation of
the activity rate of the prime working-age population
(25–54 years-old). This represented a reversal of
previous trends towards shorter working lives and early
retirement (Arranz, 2016).
Labour market participation of
core-age men 
The 25–54 age group (the core-age group) is of special
interest for different reasons. Demographically, it is by
far the largest component of the working-age
population, encompassing 209 million people in the EU
in 2015, of whom 30 million were inactive. It
corresponds to the age when workers are at their most
productive, have generally completed their formal
education and have not yet retired, resulting in high
labour market activity rates. For these reasons, this has
always been the age cohort with the highest
employment and activity rates. Nonetheless, the
employment rate of core-age men in Europe has been in
secular decline since the 1970/1980s. In the most recent
years, this decline was sharpened by the global financial
crisis, and the employment rate in the EU in 2015
remains well below pre-crisis levels, three percentage
points lower. A similar phenomenon started earlier and
more intensively in the USA, where employment and
activity rates in this category have been in decline since
the mid-1950s (Council of Economic Advisers, 2016).
Women have accounted for more than three-quarters of
the overall increase in the core-age labour force in the
EU in the past 20 years. And unlike the USA, where peak
female employment rates occurred in the late 1990s,
the labour market integration of women in Europe
appears still to be in a phase of structural increase,
albeit one interrupted by the economic shocks post-
2008 (Figure 10).
For core-age men, recent aggregate employment
trajectories are more similar between the EU and the
USA. In both, employment rates are significantly lower
now than in 1998 (and lower still compared with the
1960s and early 1970s). In the EU15, the employment
rate decreased from 86% in 1998 to 83% in 2015 – with a
steeper decline since the economic crisis – and has not
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Figure 9: Contributions to employment rate change, EU15, 1998–2015      
























Employment rate 1998 = 61.2%
Employment rate 2015 = 66.1%
Change = 4.9 percentage points
33
reached the pre-recession rate. In the USA, the rate
decreased from 89% in 1998 to 84% in 2015, with the
lowest values in the years of the crisis (Figure 10).
Looking instead at labour market participation (that is,
the share of the population either employed or seeking
employment), the decline in the male core-age
employment rate in the USA has been mirrored by a
decrease in overall participation. After reaching its peak
in the mid-1950s (98% in 1954), the activity rate saw
faster declines from the mid-1960s and, since then, it
has fallen continuously (more intensively during
recessionary periods) until the present (88% in 2015).
The trend in the overall European activity rate has been
quite different; despite having slowed down over time,
it maintained a positive and growing trend until 2014
and remains very close to its recent high at 85.5% in
2015 – a figure which is 3.8 percentage points above the
1998 value (Figure 11).
Changes in labour market participation
Figure 10: Core-age employment rate trends, by year and sex, EU15 and USA, 1998–2015       
Note: Workers aged 25–54 years-old.
























Figure 11: Core-age labour market activity rate trends, by year and sex, EU15 and USA, 1998–2015       
Note: Workers aged 25–54 years-old.





























Core-age female employment and activity rates in the
EU15 have to a certain extent counterbalanced the
overall effects of decreasing employment and
participation rates for men of the same age group.
Female participation has contributed strongly to
maintaining the positive trend in the overall average
participation rate over time.
Possible factors affecting core-age
male employment and activity
Analyses from the Council of Economic Advisers (2016)
explore the factors that may have contributed to the
decrease in the core-age male employment and activity
rates in the USA. These encompass demographic
characteristics (education, family and migration status),
supply-driven factors (men choosing not to work given a
certain set of labour market conditions), demand-
related factors (secular employment decline in
male-employing sectors) and institutional factors, and
can provide a framework for a similar analysis on
Europe. The following sections identify selectively some
of the important contributing factors identified in the
US analysis that may be playing a role in both the EU
and the USA.
Education
Educational attainment levels have been rising in the
workforce as older, generally less-well-educated
cohorts retire and younger, better-educated cohorts
start their working careers. In the EU as a whole, there
were 20 million more core-age graduates in
employment in 2015 compared with 2002, but 15 million
fewer people with lower-level qualifications. 
While the educational outperformance of women over
the period is reflected in their disproportionate share of
net new graduate jobs (an increase of 12.2 million
compared with 8.1 million for men), there has still been
a very significant educational upgrading among core-
age men. As higher levels of education generally signal
greater probability of successful labour market
integration, it is perhaps surprising that overall
educational upgrading has been accompanied by a
decrease, not an increase, in core-age male
employment rates.
Taking data for men for the EU15 for 1998–2015, Figure
12 offers an answer to this conundrum. Both
employment rates and participation rates have
decreased over the period in each of the educational
categories but the lower the level of qualifications, the
sharper the declines. Both rates were not too dissimilar
in 2002. For example, the gap between the core-age
employment rate for men of basic education (ISCED 0–2)
and those with a tertiary-level degree (ISCED 5–8) was
only nine percentage points in 2002. By 2015, it was
nearly 20 percentage points.
In summary, even though educational level has become
an even more important determinant of labour market
participation and employment rates, the actual rates of
employment and participation of tertiary-level-
educated people in the EU have been stable or slightly
declining since 2002. Greater differences in labour
market participation by educational level relate almost
entirely to the increasing penalties attaching to those
without tertiary education in the labour market. The
cushioning effect of a university degree is likely to have
benefited women more than men as they make up the
majority of recent graduates.
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Figure 12: Core-age male employment and activity rates, by educational attainment, EU15, 1998–2015        
Note: Core-age men aged 25–54 years-old. 



















Less than primary, primary and lower secondary educaon (ISCED  0–2)
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-terary educaon (ISCED 3–4)





















Less than primary, primary and lower secondary educaon (ISCED  0–2)
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-terary educaon (ISCED 3–4)
Terary educaon (ISCED 5–8)
Employment rates Activity rates
35
Family status
One possible hypothesis for decreasing core-age male
employment and labour market participation is that
greater sharing of family and household responsibilities
between sexes may be responsible. Working-age men
may increasingly have alternative, desirable options
outside the labour market. They may, for example, have
taken on the responsibilities traditionally performed by
stay-at-home mothers as women have increased their
labour market participation. Alternatively, the increased
incidence of female ‘breadwinners’ may have opened
up other non-work possibilities for male spouses.
However, US data that take into account the family
status of core-age men show that the decline in
participation rates for men without children has been
almost double the decline in the group with children.
Since 1968, the former saw a 9.4 percentage point
decline compared with 4.9 points in the latter (Council
of Economic Advisers, 2016).
Similar patterns can be observed in the EU for both
employment rates (Figure 13) and participation rates.
While core-age women in Europe have higher inactivity
rates if they are mothers of children aged six or under,
the opposite is the case for men: men without small
children have a higher inactivity rate (9.9% in 2015) and
a lower inactivity rate (4.1%) if they have one or more.
Again, these differences are replicated for employment
rates, which are at their lowest levels relatively for core-
age men with no children and where recent declines
have been sharper for this group than for fathers. As in
the USA, this suggests the limited relevance of greater
childcare or family responsibilities as an explanatory
factor of the labour force decline of core-age men in the
past decades.
Country of birth
The overall EU working-age and core-age populations
have been contracting since 2009. These declines have
arisen principally as a result of demographic patterns
among natives, where the declines began even earlier.
There were, for example, eight million fewer natives of
core age in the EU28 in 2015 compared with 2006, a
decline of over 4%. The decline of the native population
has been partly offset by an increase in the non-native
population of over five million. A redistribution of
similar proportions has occurred with respect to
employment, with absolute declines in the core-age
native population partially compensated by increases in
the non-native core-age population.
Two factors contribute to understanding why the core-
age male employment rates have been declining. The
first is that core-age natives account for a contracting
share of the employed core-age population. This
pattern is accentuated for core-age men in particular.
The second is that employment rates of non-native men
(especially those from non-EU countries) tend to be
lower than for natives (Figure 14).
Taken in combination, these two factors have
contributed compositionally to a modest decline in
core-age male employment rates. But the shifts in the
native–non-native employment balance are relatively
marginal phenomena. Non-natives account for around
1 in 10 workers in Europe, and the overall decline in
core-age male employment rates has been experienced
by natives and non-natives alike.
Changes in labour market participation
Figure 13: Core-age male employment rates, by number of children, EU15, 2005–2015     
Note: Core-age men aged 25–54 years-old. 
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In summary, there is limited evidence that the above
three supply-side factors explain why core-age male
employment rates have declined while those for women
and older people of both sexes have increased.
Improvements in educational attainment, while greater
for women than men, have been substantial for both
sexes and should have boosted male employment. This
has not occurred. There is no evidence to support
changing gender roles between home and workplace as
an explanation for core-age male withdrawal from the
labour market. And the impact of the contracting share
of native core-age males with increased migration is
likely to have been marginal. 
Other factors on the demand side and relating to labour
market and welfare policies may offer more useful
potential explanations. In the US analysis, shifts in
labour demand appear better able to explain the
decrease in core-age male participation in the USA
(Council of Economic Advisers, 2016). This relates to the
shifting sectoral composition of employment and, in
particular, contracting demand in predominantly male-
employing sectors such as manufacturing and
construction. The decline in demand for manufacturing
employment has been particularly sharp in the USA, but
has been a secular trend throughout the advanced
economies since the 1970s. Even in Germany, the
industry share has declined from over 30% to 19% of
employment between 1990 and 2015. 
The decline in demand for middle-skilled and mid-paid,
blue-collar jobs in mainly male sectors is likely to have
impacted male employment through various channels.
Firstly, because the alternative jobs on offer do not
match their relatively high wage demands, they may
exit the labour market altogether. Alternatively, by
adding to the supply pool for lower-skilled work, they
may have squeezed some lower-skilled workers into
unemployment or inactivity. The salience of sector-level
developments in explaining the recent decline in male
employment rates becomes obvious when one sees that
the declines sharpen noticeably after 2008 and continue
through to 2013, a period when nearly nine million net
jobs were lost in construction and manufacturing
combined in the EU. Men accounted for over three-
quarters of these losses.
Reasons for inactivity
EU-LFS data show that the main reason reported for
core-age male inactivity is having an illness or disability
(Figure 15). It is not indicated whether this is related to
receiving disability benefits or public support, though in
many cases the assumption is that this is the case.
There was a much higher incidence of inactivity
attributed to illness or disability for men than for
women in this age group in 2015 (41% versus 17%), but
this is in very large part a result of the even bigger
gender gap in family or caring responsibilities. This is
the main gender difference: around half of inactive
women in 2015 cited personal or family reasons as the
main causes of their inactivity compared with less than
1 out of 10 inactive men (49% compared with 8%).
The second most cited reason for male inactivity is
participation in education or training (16%) and the
third is discouragement (11%). There was a small
increase between 2008 and 2015 in the share of core-
age men citing family or caring responsibilities as their
reason for inactivity, but the main shift over the period –
mainly for men – has been the decline in (early)
retirement and the increase in discouragement (those
who are inactive because of their belief that no work is
available).
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Figure 14: Core-age male employment and activity rates, by country of birth, EU15, 1998–2015         
Note: Core-age men aged 25–54 years-old. 
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Looking at the correlations between the reasons for
inactivity and the activity rates in 2015 and their
changes since 2002, the results suggest that countries
with higher activity rates are also the ones where
inactivity is more likely to be related to having an illness
or being in education or training, and less likely to be
due to discouragement or other family or personal
responsibilities. As expected, discouragement is more
likely in countries with lower activity rates in 2015. 
Another interesting aspect is the correlation between
change in the activity rate and the status of being in
education or training. The negative correlation suggests
that those countries where activity rates have declined
are more likely to observe an increase in inactivity due
to participation in education or training (Table 11).
Changes in labour market participation
Figure 15: Main reason for not seeking employment among inactive core-age population, total and by sex,
EU, 2008–2015     
Notes: Notes: Core-age workers aged 25–54 years-old. EU25 (France, Ireland due to high rate of non-response and Malta due to non-availability
of data for 2008).
































































Own illness or disability In educaon or training
Think no work is available Rered
Looking aer children or incapacitated adults Other family or personal responsibilies
Awaing recall to work (on lay-oﬀ) Other or no answer
Table 11: Cross-country correlations between activity rates and reasons for inactivity, male core-age
workers, EU, 2015
Correlations Activity rate 2015
Change in activity rate 
2002–2015
Own illness or disability 0.29 very weak
In education or training 0.25 -0.38
Think no work is available -0.60 very weak
Looking after children or incapacitated adults very weak very weak
Other family or personal responsibilities -0.46 very weak
Retired very weak very weak
Awaiting recall to work (on lay-off) very weak very weak
Other very weak very weak
Notes: Reasons are reported for men aged 25–49; activity and employment rates for men aged 25–54. Weak = 0.20–0.39; moderate = 0.40–0.59;
strong = 0.60–0.79; very strong = 0.80–1.0. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)  
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Reasons cited for inactivity vary widely across countries
for men of core age. While the main reason cited (illness
or disability) accounts for over half of inactivity in this
category in 11 Member States in 2015, in Italy it
accounted for only 17% (Figure 16). Similarly, the share
of inactive core-age men citing education or training as
the main reason for not seeking work was much higher
in Denmark and Germany (both 29%) and Sweden
(27%), but 5% or less in Member States such as Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland. The share of those citing
discouragement – namely their belief that no work
exists – was correspondingly much higher in Bulgaria
(29%) and Italy (28%) but in the low single-digit
percentages in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Sweden and the UK.
Focus on disability and disability schemes
The differences between countries in the main reasons
given for being out of work can be, at least in part,
interpreted as a function of existing institutional
frameworks and incapacity schemes. This may also help
identify possible substitution effects between inactivity
and unemployment. An example of special relevance is
inactivity due to illness, as the characteristics of
disability schemes can play a role in determining the
size of the inactive population and in influencing those
substitution effects.
Looking at the main disability schemes in the UK and at
their reforms over time, Banks et al (2015) highlighted
the high impact of these schemes on overall public
spending (until the 1980s), which subsequent reforms
have tried to reduce. Despite this, the number of
recipients in 2013 was still at very high levels. According
to Banks et al (2015, p. 2):
at the end of 2013, 2.3 million individuals in Great
Britain were receiving disability benefits, and while
this was lower than the 2.5 million recipients of these
benefits in 1995, the total was still higher than any
year prior to the mid-1990s and more than twice the
level seen in any year in the 1970s or the first half of
the 1980s. 
Participation in these schemes varied based on sex, age
and educational levels. For instance, looking at recent
data on the Employment and Support Allowance
scheme, launched through the last 2008 reform, the
Estimating labour market slack in the European Union 
Figure 16: Main reason of inactive core-age men for not seeking employment, EU Member States, 2015     
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)
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authors observed that for a given level of health status,
men were more likely to be on disability benefits than
women. Increasingly, as the replacement levels of
disability benefits have declined over time, the share of
those with low education on such benefits has
increased. It is also noted that there has been a
systematic growth over time in the share of claimants
citing mental or behavioural disorders as their principal
health condition.
A recent analysis sheds light on the relationship
between economic inactivity among working-age men,
the destruction of manufacturing jobs and the use of
incapacity benefits in the UK (Beatty and Fothergill,
2016). These authors observed strong variations across
the country in the distribution of incapacity claimants.
The highest incapacity claimant rates (10% and above)
were found in old industrial areas, while they were
much lower in areas with a strong local economy.
Despite the higher level of health problems associated
with industrial activities, incapacity rates only increased
when the local industrial economy started to shrink.
Many longer-term incapacity claimants also benefit
from other allowances, such as the Disability Living
Allowance, in addition to the Employment and Support
Allowance. The old industrial regions record higher
numbers of unemployment claimants and of inactivity.
Once well-paid manufacturing workers have tended to
opt out of the labour market due to the low wages they
are currently offered in the only alternative forms of
employment.
Earlier work by the same authors estimated that around
35% of the 2.55 million incapacity benefit claimants in
the UK in 2012 were in reality ‘hidden unemployed’
(Beatty et al, 2012). This was based on benchmarking
claimant levels across UK regions against southern
England and controlling for observed variations in
historical levels of incapacity and ill-health across the
regions. It made clear that such benefits were relatively
attractive compared with Jobseekers’ Allowance – the
main unemployment benefit – as they were subject to
less conditionality, less means testing and limited
obligations to ‘sign on’, and benefit levels were
generally somewhat higher. They noted that the UK
incapacity claimant count had quadrupled in 30 years
and that such increases were impossible to explain in
terms of health alone as general health levels had
improved over the same period.
Another relevant example is the Dutch case: the
Netherlands also has a generous disability insurance
scheme in place compared with other European
countries (Koning and Lindeboom, 2015). It also has one
of the highest national shares of core-age men declaring
illness or disability as the cause for inactivity. This
scheme was first conceived in the 1960s as a broad
programme addressing not only workers with serious
health problems, but also all those who for health
reasons were less employable than others. It differs
from other schemes as its eligibility covers any worker
who would experience income losses due to any injury
(and not necessarily occupational injuries) and because
sick workers are paid their wages in the waiting period
before receiving disability benefit. These factors make it
particularly attractive for workers and also weaken the
incentive for eligible workers to return to work quickly.
In addition, employers find the scheme attractive as an
alternative to unemployment since it eliminates the
need to pay severance or firing costs. As in the UK,
changes have been introduced more recently to reduce
substitution effects between disability and
unemployment.
Estonia is another Member State where a high share of
core-age male inactivity is attributable to illness or
incapacity. The analysis by Sundaram et al (2014) of EU-
SILC data shows that levels of disability increased
significantly in absolute numbers between 2007 and
2011 in the country. Disabled Estonians (above 35 years
of age) tend to have little or no previous work
experience and to receive ‘quite generous’ disability
benefits (often accounting for a large part of their
household income – 70% on average). According to the
authors, the combination of age, the receipt of
substantial disability benefits and the lack of previous
work experience makes this group less likely to re-enter
the labour market, even in those cases where the
physical disability levels are not high.
Focus on discouraged core-age men
After illness or disability and being in education or
training, thinking that no work is available is the third
most common reason mentioned by core-age men in
Europe for not seeking employment. As already
indicated, shares of ‘discouraged’ core-age men are
especially high in Bulgaria and Italy – two Member
States where the workforce has contracted and
unemployment rates were significantly higher in 2015
than in 2008.
In their analysis of labour market exclusion in Bulgaria,
Sundaram et al (2014) identified the cluster of middle-
aged unemployed as one of key groups within the
out-of-work population in the country (accounting for
around one-quarter of it). This class – previously not so
relevant – grew as a consequence of the crisis and the
resulting increase in joblessness and long-term
unemployment in the country. The coverage of the
unemployment benefits is comparatively low in
Bulgaria, with strict eligibility criteria and quite a short
entitlement period for those with a limited work history.
Nonetheless, the job search requirements for those
receiving the benefits are limited, restricting the
possibilities of a quick activation of those who would be
ready to work (European Commission, 2016b).
In Italy, Contini and Grand (2014) stressed the relevance
of the phenomenon of ‘workforce disposal’ in the
country – referring to the process by which individuals,
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having lost their regular job, are unlikely to re-enter
regular employment again over a long subsequent
period. Based on longitudinal data, they estimated
survival rates in employment for young men aged 19–30
in the late 1980s/early 1990s and found that one in five
was inactive by the time they were in their 40s or early
50s. Many of them become long-term unemployed,
abandon the workforce or join the irregular economy,
engaging in undeclared work. One mechanism is that of
the non-renewal of short-term and precarious
contracts, especially for younger workers, and their
subsequent replacement by new, even less-experienced
workers. A high share of those made jobless in this way
end up formally inactive. Contini (2016, p. 20)
speculated based on available data that ‘the vast
majority of disposed individuals are either irregular
workers or self-report as inactive (available to work) or
both, but only a few could be officially unemployed’. He
estimated that the share who end up working in the
informal or irregular economy could be as high as 80%–
85%, but also argued that a realistic estimate of
unemployment in Italy would be 4–5 percentage points
higher than the current official estimate, given the large
share of individuals self-reporting in surveys as inactive
but available to work who are in reality ‘discouraged
unemployed’. One conclusion is that the EU-LFS offers
only a very approximate characterisation of the
‘disposed’ worker phenomenon. Another is that the
EU-LFS data for Italy that show relatively high levels of
inactivity and discouragement, including among
core-age men, conceal significant shares of both
‘hidden employment’ and ‘hidden unemployment’.
As in other European countries, job losses during the
Great Recession affected men in Italy more than women
(Ghignoni and Verashchagina, 2016) and levels of
non-employment grew more among men than among
women (Ghignoni and Verashchagina, 2013). This can be
in part explained as an ‘added worker’ effect in certain
households (female partners entering the labour force
to offset the job or income loss of their male partners)
(Eurofound, 2016). This happened in a context of one of
the lowest female participation and employment rates
in Europe (European Commission, 2016c) and is
consistent with the observation of Bettio et al (2013)
that there was a reduction in gender gaps in activity,
employment and unemployment over the crisis period
in Europe.
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Although the recent structural trend has been for increasing employment and participation rates overall, there
has been one important category in particular for which this has not been the case – core-age men. Relatively
high and increasing shares of inactivity resulting from labour market discouragement or illness or disability
appear to have been contributory factors to this decline. As in the USA, there has been a decline in the EU in
labour demand for lower-skilled workers, which appears to have impacted disproportionately on men and on
predominantly male-employing sectors. This decline has been partly structural (for instance, in manufacturing)
but was exacerbated by sector-specific developments in many countries following the global financial crisis (for
instance, in construction). The fact that alternative service sector jobs for those male workers losing their
construction and manufacturing jobs were comparatively poorly paid may also have discouraged many from
re-entering the labour market. Where other forms of social support such as incapacity benefits were accessible, it
appears that they have become an important alternative path to non-employment.
Summary 
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Labour supply in Europe is changing in ways that make
labour markets more capable of absorbing more
workers. There are more people of working age in the
labour market due to increasing participation rates, in
particular among women and older workers. There have
also been increases in the number of people who report
themselves to be willing to work but who remain
inactive and of people who are working part time but
would like to work longer hours, as well as the number
of unemployed job-seekers. Only the latter group are
captured by the unemployment rate – the standard
metric of labour market performance.
It is essential, therefore, to look beyond the
unemployment rate if a more nuanced and complete
picture of labour slack is to be developed. There are four
people of working age who are inactive for every one
that is unemployed in Europe; many in the inactive
category express a wish to work even though they do
not fulfil the strict conditions that define unemployed
status.
The approach in this report has been to estimate and
characterise the broader category of labour slack,
mainly based on the concept of ‘potential additional
labour force’ developed by Eurostat, itself based on
long-running ILO methodological work. It is one of a
number of different methods that have been developed
to estimate labour slack, many of them originating in
the USA, but it has the advantage of lending itself to a
detailed analysis of Member State labour markets using
the EU-LFS. It offers a useful methodology for describing
the grey areas between the three core labour market
statuses of employment, unemployment and inactivity.
In particular, it allows the significant share of those who
are technically inactive but who nonetheless are
available, seeking or willing to work to be identified. The
analysis in this report estimates a broader labour slack
rate including these categories and taking account also
of the working hours desired but not worked by
involuntary part-timers. It then compares this with the
more publicised, official unemployment rates in each
Member State.
There were 23 million people unemployed in the EU in
2015 but an average worker equivalent of 38–44 million
individuals who indicated some labour market
attachment using broader measures of labour slack.
Both unemployment and labour slack levels and rates
were higher in 2015 than in 2008, with the labour slack
rate at nearly 15% compared with an unemployment
rate of 9.5%. The labour slack rate rose more slowly
than the unemployment rate in the immediate
aftermath of the Great Recession, but it also took longer
to peak and only began recovering in 2014, a year after
the unemployment rate. Not unlike the long-term
unemployment rate, there is evidence, therefore, that
labour slack, broadly defined, reacts with some lag to
broader economic and labour market conditions. This is
important as it suggests that a strengthening recovery
need not necessarily entail increased inflation. A buffer
of labour reserve made up of those wanting to work
longer hours or of the inactive who may be mobilised by
increased labour demand to come off the sidelines of
the labour market should serve to mitigate such
pressures. While this buffer began shrinking in 2014 and
the analysis in this report ends in 2015, based on
extrapolating from recent trends, it is likely to still have
some way to go before it returns to pre-crisis levels.
Beyond the population of unemployed job-seekers, the
two largest categories of labour slack were involuntary
part-timers (nearly 10 million in 2015, almost 1 in 4 part-
timers) and those who were available and wishing to
work but who were not seeking work and therefore
considered inactive rather than unemployed (nearly 9
million in 2015).
In terms of the characteristics of these two largest
groups, involuntary part-timers were more likely to
have started their current job within the last year and to
work in basic or lower-level service occupations and
sectors (for instance, household work). They were also
more likely to be women, but this is mainly a result of
the greater female share of part-time workers overall;
looking just at the part-time population and controlling
for other factors, men were more likely than women to
be working part time involuntarily.
The second large category of labour slack is that of
inactive people available for but not seeking work. The
main reason given by this group for not seeking work is
discouragement – the belief that no work is available.
This has increased – markedly so for men – since 2008,
probably as a result of the severe impacts of the
recession on predominantly male-employing sectors
such as manufacturing and construction. Controlling for
other characteristics, however, women were at greater
risk of being inactive and available but not seeking work
compared with being unemployed. The strongest
determinants of belonging to this category were age –
the older, the more likely – and time elapsed since the
person’s last job.
One policy-relevant conclusion is that, despite rapidly
increasing older worker participation rates, there still
remains a sizeable potential workforce among older
people willing to work but discouraged from doing so.
The fact that there is such a steep age gradient for
discouragement could imply barriers of perceived or
actual age discrimination or of obsolete skills.
5 Conclusions  
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The variation in increased labour market performance
across EU Member States after 2008 is also evident in
broader labour slack trends. Indeed, the addition of
labour slack categories beyond those of the formally
unemployed tends to increase the gaps between the
most recession-affected countries and those where
labour markets recovered more quickly and more
robustly. Two Member States in particular stand out in
the analysis: Italy and Germany. The labour slack rate in
Italy was almost double that of the unemployment rate;
a quarter of the working-age population are either
unemployed or in one of the other labour slack
categories. Over a half of the EU’s discouraged workers
were in Italy in 2015. The improved labour market
performance in Germany is, if anything, more evident
when measured in terms of labour slack rather than
unemployment. There were, for example, almost a
million fewer involuntary part-timers in Germany in
2015 compared with 2008, and the other labour slack
categories had also contracted. Alongside Hungary, it
was one of only two Member States in which the labour
slack rate shrank between 2008 and 2015.
One of the less-heralded achievements of European
labour markets in recent years has been the belated
surpassing of the employment targets originally set in
the Lisbon Strategy of 2010 – despite a major recession.
But while employment and participation rates have
grown in comparatively underrepresented categories,
they have declined for core-age men (25–54 years-old),
traditionally the category with the strongest labour
market attachment. This decline has been most marked
in the USA, where related policy concerns about this
development have resulted in extensive recent analysis,
but a milder version of the same phenomenon can be
observed in EU Member States as well.
In large part, the explanations are likely to be structural.
Men are overrepresented in sectors such as agriculture
and manufacturing that have been shrinking in relative
terms over an extended period. This longer-term trend
has been compounded by the strongly selective effects
of the recession on both manufacturing as well as
construction, again another predominantly male-
employing sector.
Other alternative explanations for decreasing core-age
male activity prove less convincing, in the EU as well as
the USA. Improvements in educational attainment,
while greater for women than men, have been
substantial for both sexes over recent decades and
ought to have boosted male employment. This has not
happened, and the penalty for lower levels of
educational attainment has become more severe. Men
are also only marginally more likely now than in the
past to be outside the labour market due to the
assumption of unpaid caring responsibilities. This is
unlikely to be an important reason for increasing core-
age male inactivity.
There is some evidence from national research (for
example, in the UK) showing high levels of inactivity
associated with receipt of incapacity benefits; this has
tended to be concentrated in older industrial regions.
Alternative employment possibilities are also likely to
be less well paid than the relatively well-paid, blue-
collar jobs in manufacturing or construction that many
such men have worked in until recently. Less stringently
applied eligibility requirements for incapacity benefits
may make take-up of such benefits, relatively speaking,
an attractive alternative to unemployment in locally
depressed labour markets. Individuals receiving such
benefits, mainly male, are categorised as inactive rather
than unemployed. More generally, the EU-LFS data
point to increasing withdrawal from the labour market
due to discouragement – believing no work is available
– among core-age men. That such patterns are observed
in regions and countries where the process of
deindustrialisation has advanced most suggests a
linkage between processes of structural change and
labour market participation that appears to be
unfavourable for core-age men, in particular to those
without higher-level educational qualifications.
One final conclusion is that it is of increasing
importance to look beyond the headline labour market
indicators in order to see what is happening in our
labour markets and why. There are more inactive ‘job-
wanters’ than active job-seekers (unemployed). While
they can represent particular challenges to active
labour market policy, many of these can and will be
mobilised to return to the labour market if the recovery
that began in 2013 can be sustained. 
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Austria 3,929 172 45 37 132 4.2 8.9
Belgium 4,414 333 18 73 33 7.0 9.4
Bulgaria 3,305 198 8 21 207 5.7 11.6
Croatia 1,725 165 14 12 98 8.7 14.3
Cyprus 371 15 3 2 5 3.8 6.0
Czech Republic 4,934 229 5 22 33 4.4 5.5
Denmark 2,807 101 21 20 42 3.5 6.1
Estonia 632 37 2 0 21 5.6 8.8
Finland 2,496 172 23 54 61 6.4 11.0
France 25,813 2,019 409 474 485 7.3 11.6
Germany 38,652 3,140 1,046 789 473 7.5 12.4
Greece 4,523 387 40 22 43 7.9 9.8
Hungary 3,818 326 3 12 168 7.9 11.8
Ireland 2,081 145 17 9 15 6.5 8.2
Italy 22,699 1,658 148 159 2,598 6.8 16.7
Latvia 1,009 88 8 7 48 8.0 13.1
Lithuania 1,397 87 7 28 35 5.9 10.1
Luxembourg 202 11 1 1 1 5.1 6.3
Netherlands 8,405 260 46 73 255 3.0 7.0
Poland 15,557 1,207 96 110 614 7.2 11.5
Portugal 4,786 417 45 13 68 8.0 10.2
Romania 8,882 575 78 2 284 6.1 9.6
Slovakia 2,423 256 6 9 47 9.5 11.6
Slovenia 975 46 5 4 14 4.5 6.6
Spain 20,318 2,594 392 210 790 11.3 16.4
Sweden 4,494 303 81 87 93 6.3 11.2
UK 28,916 1,758 329 295 437 5.7 8.9
EU 219,563 16,701 2,896 2,545 7,098 7.1 11.8
Table A1: Summary of labour force categories and unemployment and labour slack rates, by EU Member State, 2008
Notes: Malta omitted due to missing data. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculation)  
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There are two possible measures of involuntary part-
time work using EU-LFS data. Method 1, the one used in
the report, is based on those self-reported part-timers
who indicate a wish to work more hours and an
availability to do so. Method 2 is based on those self-
reported part-timers who give as their reason for
working part time that ‘they could not find a full-time
job’.
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Annex 2: Estimates of involuntary part-time employment 
Table A2: Different estimates of involuntary part-time employment (thousands), EU Member States, 2008
and 2015     
2008 2015
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
Austria 133 100 180 138
Belgium 37 143 168 109
Bulgaria 18 31 27 38
Croatia 33 24 42 25
Cyprus 7 8 32 31
Czech Republic 17 29 30 41
Denmark 67 85 66 104
Estonia 5 5 8 8
Finland 69 88 94 105
France 1,362 1,474 1,849 1,974
Germany 2,449 2,175 1,551 1,448
Greece 98 108 242 234
Hungary 6 47 67 87
Ireland 44 48 110 151
Italy 396 1,319 742 2,629
Latvia 23 19 26 21
Lithuania 17 20 22 32
Luxembourg 1 3 6 7
Malta n.d. n.d. 4 4
Netherlands 98 155 573 348
Poland 255 223 318 326
Portugal 94 169 231 211
Romania 215 396 267 427
Slovakia 18 14 58 42
Slovenia 13 n.d. 31 n.d.
Spain 817 871 1,497 1,773
Sweden 212 273 209 306
UK 959 n.d. 1,399 1,302
EU 7,464 7,830 9,850 11,920
Note: n.d. = no data. 
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculation)  
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Annexes
Annex 3: Breakdown of inactive workers seeking but not available for
work
Table A3: Categories of inactive workers, seeking but not available for work (thousands), EU Member States,
2015     
Actively seeking work,
not available Future starters Other Total
Austria 36.0 3.2 0.4 39.6
Belgium 21.8 17.6 14.0 53.3
Bulgaria 5.7 4.5 9.4 19.6
Croatia 0.7 1.4 0.6 2.7
Cyprus 13.1 4.7 0.5 18.2
Czech Republic 331.9 78.3 75.7 485.9
Denmark 17.4 2.7 0.6 20.7
Estonia 2.0 0.9 0.0 2.9
Finland 103.9 43.2 55.8 202.9
France 43.4 12.6 1.7 57.7
Germany 162.8 100.4 35.0 298.2
Greece 14.2 18.4 8.2 40.8
Hungary 10.0 1.9 0.0 11.9
Ireland 6.2 2.1 0.9 9.2
Italy 5.0 2.1 5.7 12.9
Latvia 39.8 53.9 9.6 103.3
Lithuania 8.4 2.3 0.1 10.8
Luxembourg 5.0 2.6 0.1 7.7
Malta 4.4 0.8 0.1 5.2
Netherlands 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3
Poland 133.7 22.3 0.0 156.0
Portugal 62.5 37.7 2.0 102.2
Romania 14.3 1.5 7.2 23.0
Slovakia 3.5 0.9 0.0 4.4
Slovenia 62.4 40.7 3.5 106.5
Spain 3.1 0.2 0.4 3.6
Sweden 10.8 2.5 0.5 13.8
UK 253.6 65.8 12.2 331.6
EU 1,375.8 525.2 244.1 2,145.1
Note: People aged 15–64.  

















Labour market slack is the shortfall between the
volume of work desired by workers and the actual
volume of work available. The most important
indicator of labour slack is the unemployment rate,
but an exclusive focus on this fails to take account
of the four-fifths of the jobless population who are
inactive rather than unemployed. Many people in
this group have some form of labour market
attachment – they would like to work, are seeking
work or are available to work. In addition, many
part-time workers would like to work longer hours.
The aim of this report is to develop a more
nuanced estimate of labour slack using EU Labour
Force Survey data, which allows involuntary part-
timers and inactive people with some labour
market attachment to be identified and quantified.
The authors calculate that there were around 50
million people in the broad category of labour
slack in 2015 and that labour slack has been slower
to fall in response to the recovery than
unemployment.
The European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a
tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is
to provide knowledge in the area of social,
employment and work-related policies.
Eurofound was established in 1975 by Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75, to contribute to the
planning and design of better living and working
conditions in Europe.
